

The case so outlined does not rest upon elaborate theorems connected with abstruse points in economics or international trade, but upon the obvious facts of the life around us, as that the people of the great State—one might take as a type Russia—are not better in any way than the people of the small State (Switzerland, Holland, Norway, for instance); while the proposition that in the last resort civilization must rest upon something other than force is demonstrated every time the Conservative party, say, surrender the government in favour of their political enemies, the Liberals, although they (the Conservatives) know that force in the shape of the army may be on their side and against their political opponents; and is daily demonstrated by the fact that the army—which is the physical force of the country—does not in Britain appropriate rule to itself, as it would in certain other countries like Mexico or Venezuela. British liberties are secure, not because of the greater relative strength of its army or its physical force to its population, but because a political oath or convention can here be depended upon, and in Venezuela it cannot. And if within the frontier we have relative freedom and security, it is because there is no ethic or ideal which is placed above adherence to the social oath or compact, above truth and justice. Whereas in the international field there is an ideal which is placed above those things: all in some degree believe that patriotism should be so placed. “My country, right or wrong,” is, wherever our formal allegiance may be given, the accepted morality of patriotism. As General Mercier, in defending the army of France against an accusation of injustice, so truly said, “What has justice to do with patriotism?”

The first chapter of this volume contains an attempt