

14. The resultant suspicions of the "capitalist" powers held by many progressive groups inside Europe, and the pressure of "progressive" attitudes from only partially-informed public opinion in the United Kingdom, the United States, and elsewhere on their governments, has hampered western policy perhaps no less than the early prejudices of conservatives. It has been partly responsible, for example, for a widespread misinterpretation of Soviet policy as essentially democratic - a misinterpretation which may even yet seriously jeopardise wise foreign policies by democratic nations - and partly responsible for various gratuitous concessions to Soviet expansionism for which, though many of them were on the whole necessary and desirable in themselves, we could have obtained a useful quid pro quo (e.g. arms for Marshal Tito in Yugoslavia).

15. Even now the foreign policies of the United Kingdom and the United States are perhaps open to criticism on the grounds that it fails to take adequate account of "progressive" ideologies, and thus meets with more opposition both at home and abroad than should be necessary. It is on the whole true, for example, that desirable social reforms seem to take place in Soviet-liberated regions with the whole-hearted approval (to put it mildly) of the Soviet Government, but in Anglo-American liberated or occupied regions either against our will or with our grudging acquiescence. Again, the United Kingdom and United States Governments have tended to judge foreign regimes mainly by the criterion of legitimacy, the Soviet Government mainly by the criterion of what that regime is likely to be and do. The latter viewpoint, while less "liberal", is obviously the more realistic and mature.

16. But it seems clear that in what has hitherto been the close link, especially in relatively backward areas, between socially progressive ideologies on the one hand and the totalitarian power-instruments of the Soviet Union on the other, there lies a contradiction which unless resolved is potentially most dangerous to the future of democratic civilization. This contradiction and hence this danger is the result, of course, not primarily of Soviet intrigues but of gaps and vacuums which have hitherto existed in democratic civilisation itself.

17. In any case, whatever the validity of these general reflections, the technical conclusions seem clear. A general policy of indiscriminate western "softness" to the Soviet Union - however it arises, from moral charitableness, from lack of sufficient coordinating machinery in our fortunately non-totalitarian civilization, or from some deeper causes - may not produce satisfactory results.

18. During the weeks immediately preceding Mr. Roosevelt's death, a telegraph discussion accordingly took place between Mr. Churchill, the President, Sir Archibald Clark Kerr and Mr. Harriman regarding general policy toward the Soviet Union. On the whole Mr. Churchill and Mr. Harriman advocated "toughness". President Roosevelt and Sir Archibald, while also tending toward this general view, were prepared to temper firmness for a while with slightly more moderate methods. Sir Archibald came round to the definitely "tough" school (as some of his telegrams referred to in Memorandum "A" on economic policies will illustrate). I understand that shortly before his tragic death President Roosevelt also came to share the opinion that toughness was now urgently desirable, and in general that a more essentially "bargaining" technique should be considered. Mr. Truman's views remain to be seen. This will presumably be one of the main subjects of discussion between the new President and Mr. Harriman, who is returning to Washington for consultation.