

participating in the Congo operation, should have to ascertain the facts from the U.S. Also, we think it is a little early to launch into an assessment of the Jadotville episode until the final scene in Katanga has been played. We therefore share U.N. Division's reluctance to embark on a piecemeal or premature study of the implications of the Congo experience for future U.N. peace-keeping operations.⁷

R.E. C[OLLINS]

11.

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*Note du sous-secrétaire d'État adjoint aux Affaires extérieures
pour le chef de la 1^{ère} Direction de liaison avec la Défense*

*Memorandum from Assistant Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs
to Head, Defence Liaison (I) Division*

CONFIDENTIAL

Ottawa, January 19, 1963

CONGO – TRAINING OF ANC

During the week, Ivan White of the U.S. Embassy, acting on instructions from the State Department, expressed to the CCOS and myself the U.S. Government's hope that Canada would be able to respond favourably to the proposals for Canadian participation in the training of the ANC outlined to our Embassy in Washington on the basis of the recommendations made by Colonel Greene's mission to the Congo. He took advantage of the occasion to express also the U.S. Government's warm appreciation of the valuable contribution which Canada has made around the world through its participation in a variety of U.N. peace-keeping activities.

2. Air Chief Marshal Miller said that the undertaking given last autumn by Canada to furnish 5 or 6 retired bilingual officers to take part in the training of the ANC still stood in principle. There would, in his estimation, be no need to seek new government authority to contribute up to that level. He noted, however, that the contribution now asked of Canada as a result of the Greene mission – to supply the officer in charge of the training mission and to staff the proposed U.N. military academy – differed from the Canadian contribution asked last autumn, and the officers we had in mind then for the assignment might not be suitable for the new requirement. More precise information was needed concerning the rank and skills required before a further effort could be made to locate and assign Canadian personnel. White said that he would have his people make further enquiries and supply the necessary information. (Our Embassy in Washington should perhaps be so notified.)

3. CCOS agreed with the American assessment that any real prospect of phasing out ONUC and putting a final end to the commitment of contributing nations to that body, ultimately depended upon the ability of the U.N. quickly to train the ANC to take over the maintenance of the internal security of the Congo.

R C[AMPBELL]

⁷ Note marginale :/Marginal note:

It is reasonably apparent that the Sec[retary]-Gen[eral] has been saying one thing in N.Y. (to UK, Belg[ium], Fr[ance]) while at the same time tacitly condoning what was being done in the field by the U.N. C[omman]d[er]. Given the imperatives of the Congo situation – the imminent exhaustion of UN funds & withdrawal of Indian troops, Tshombe's record of deception, etc., U Thant has had no option but to allow events to run their course, including the present military offensive. I do not think we should inject ourselves into this very delicate situation by a premature inquisition. R. C[ampbell] 14/1.