He suggests as a preventive measure that there should be severe punishment of unsuccessful offenders, and that every effort should be made by the law and by the public to put additional force upon the moral sense of the community by making the crime more odious and detestable. We think if the figures prove anything, they prove that some effort directed against the last two items would be desirable.

IT is a moot point who is the "meanest man on earth." But the defendant in *Reif* v. *Paige*, 13 N. W. Rep. 273 (U.S.), should not be overlooked in this connection. This gentleman's unhappy wife (except in as far as she was happy in leaving the defendant—we trust for a happier home) was in a building which was enveloped in flames. The husband, with great magnanimity and in a burst of uxorious enthusiasm, cried out, "I will give $5,000 to any person who will bring the body of my wife from that building, dead or alive." A fireman, on the faith of the offer, and at the risk of his own life, rushed into the building and brought out the body. Whatever Mr. Paige might have thought his living wife worth, he thought better of his offer as to her dead body, and refused to pay the $5,000, on the grounds: (1) That there was no formal acceptance of the defendant's offer; and (2) that as the latter was a paid official he had only done his duty—which we presume he thought to be a reward sufficient in itself. The Court thought differently, and very properly held that the fireman was not bound to give notice of acceptance of the offer as a condition precedent to recovery, nor was he bound to perform the service as a paid fireman, not being called upon in discharge of his duty to imperil his own life.

RIVERS AND STREAMS.

A careful perusal of the judgment of the Supreme Court in *McLaren* v. *Caldwell*, impresses one that the law as laid down in *Boale* v. *Dickson* is sound; and we shall be surprised if the last judgment on this vexed question is not upheld in England, should the case go there for further consideration. This perusal, however, tells us another thing, and that is, that a "new hand at the bellows" on our staff got hold of the wrong end of it in supposing that the legislation discussed in the case was the act we had occasion to criticise more than a year ago, and the consequent remarks in the item referred to are therefore inappropriate.

The subject of rivers and streams in connection with the lumbering interests has come up in another form, in the case of the *Parry Sound Lumbering Co.* v. *Ferris*, in which the junior Judge of the County of Simcoe (John A. Ardagh, Esq.) gave a judgment which carries conviction with it, and is a clear and exhaustive exposition of the law on the subject. It was published *in extenso* in our last number.

The plaintiffs applied for an order under the Act R. S. O. c. 114, to enable them to turn a lake, some fifteen miles distant from their mill, into a reservoir, for the purpose of improving their property. Evidence was given shewing that to grant the application would prove very injurious to those residing near the lake, and the jury had to determine the question: Would the erection of a dam at the outlet of the lake conduce to the public good? —the Act having directed that it was only in such event that an application of this character should be granted. It was chiefly to this point that the learned judge directed his attention. He shows that the course universally adopted by Legislatures, when passing Acts that may cause the expropriation of a man's property against his will, is to make all such expropriation depend on the answer to the question, "is it for the public good?"