conringen protection system has provided a system of private rights ro Comegric ladustries. Rights, once given, are very difficui: to take away. The admizistation is not likely to surzende: its GAIT-appioved escape valve for domestic proteetionist pressures.

As as alremative to a blamet exemption of bilateral tracie fron the epplica:ion of antidumpiag or countervailigg duties, the Royal Comission on the Economic Un:om and Development Prospects for Carada proposes binationai adasitstanion of these procedures for bllateval trade, whth both countries reraiñog their own procedures for faports from thite couscries. ${ }^{34}$ However, this p:oposal wouid tave administrarive costs and is unifikely to be acceptable to the U.S. Congress for the reasons cited above. Even if it is possible to aegotiate bizafional adeialstation of unsait trade remedies, key questions woulf reaaiz about the criseria for application of these renecies.

It likely woile be fore frúfiful for Canada to propose some specizic,
 negotiators shouid focus on Eeazures $a$ E U.S. tzace laws that are paz:icuia: fraitages for Canadias business and govempent polloymaking. The aego:latses couid seek clatification of the criteria for application of J.S. trade reaedies as weil as righter stanciaris of injug and causation in the 0.5. isw.

A higi priosity for Canada is to obtai= greate= precision aed certainty Eoz the definiticn of subsiey in J.S. countervailiag duef law. In cases suith as Swae and Potk, the application of this test appears azbitiary. Moze particuiariy, the deffrizioc is in a state of fiur as a result of the Gibbons bili anc othe: bills peading in Congeess. Since it is dififcult to zepeal legisiation, clarification of the adrisistzation's interpretaiten of the defintion of subsidy couid foreciose the Gibions or similar bilis. IE the Gibbons bill passes in the fouse, it woule be exteeneiy difficult to overtute through bilateral or aultilateral gegotiations.

