

assistance.⁶⁵ The *Voluntary Fund for Activities Related to the Removal and Destruction of Russian Military Equipment and Ammunition from Moldova*, developed by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) contributes towards the withdrawal of Russian military armaments and Moldova, aiding Russia in meeting its 1999 Istanbul Summit promises. The Voluntary Fund, setup in 2000, has also been used to help destroy surplus weapons and explosives in Georgia. This fund provides tangible proof of the CFE Treaty signatories increased involvement in flexible arrangements for arms control.⁶⁶

Compromise between positions was best exemplified by both the 1996 review process and the 1999 adaptation process. The issue of flank zone limitations was a sticking point during the 1996 review process. Russian inability to meet the 1990 CFE flank zone requirements by the 1995 deadline due to changing domestic political situations meant that the review process was at risk. Treaty members searched for ways to compromise between Norwegian and Turkish insistence on absolute reductions and Russian security needs for domestic problems. An American deal saw the reduction in size of the flank zones and an increase in the size of TLE allocations to the Russians in the flank. While American "leadership" over this issue was key to brokering a deal, it showed that the CFE community could reach significant compromises over important issues.⁶⁷

The 1999 Adaptation process saw the interests of NATO members in keeping Russia an active member within a broadening European security community, and as such remained open to compromise on issues. In return for a reluctant nod from Moscow for NATO enlargement, NATO could not constitute a threat, real or perceived, to Russian stability on its Western borders. TLE reductions in the Visegrad states and the territorial limits on TLEs stipulated by the Adapted Treaty has guaranteed that NATO cannot station significant numbers of troops in its new member states, and has for the moment assured Moscow of the peaceful intentions of NATO. Of course, this is dependent on ratification of the Adapted Treaty. Full Russian participation in the construction of the CFE arms control agreement has been guaranteed through a seat in the Joint Consultative Group (JCG), in Vienna. As well, the mix of both Russian and NATO interests in the final Adapted Treaty reflects the ability of Moscow to affect compromise. This ability to compromise within the broader framework of Treaty obligations bodes well for long-term viability of the CFE.

The ability to compromise will be tested with the accession of the Baltic states to both the CFE and NATO, and the continuing problem of Russian TLE outside its territory. Both issues are closely linked. Some members of the CFE (led by the US) insist that NATO enlargement and CFE accession are not linked, and that the Adapted Treaty is not valid until all requirements are met by all treaty members is opposed by Russian insistence that the link must exist and that the flank problem will continue into the near future.⁶⁸ There are members of the CFE who are more open to the linking of the two issues, recognizing the validity of Russian concerns of non-CFE members as part of NATO on their western borders.⁶⁹ The positions taken by the two sides seem firmer than in the past, and may pose a serious threat to treaty *Community*.

On the issue of rules-based behaviour, the CFE faces a unique problem. Since the 1992 ratification of the treaty, the application of sanctions in line with violations of CFE rules has not been undertaken. Why is this the case? As discussed above, flexibility within an overall framework of accepted norms, values and decision-making procedures has been the rule in applying the Treaty requirements. While the High Level Task Force (HLTF) within NATO, as well as the JCG, have the ability to apply political pressure on member states to fulfill their requirements under the CFE, there are no formal sanctions available to the member states. Does this pose a problem for the long-term viability of the CFE? In the opinion of this author, the answer is no. Both inspections, verifications, and information exchanges have been useful tools in evaluating compliance with the rules. A high degree of compliance has been the

⁶⁵ Karoly Banai and Pal Dunay, "The CFE Compliance Record After Treaty Signature," *The Geneva Centre for Security Policy*, Working Paper, February 2002, p. 8.

⁶⁶ Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, *Annual Report 2001 on OSCE Activities*, November 26, 2001. The Voluntary Fund will also assist in the destruction of surplus weapons and ammunition in Georgia; OSCE Press Release, "OSCE States will fund long-term scheme to destroy surplus weapons and explosives in Georgia," January 30, 2003.

⁶⁷ This is a very good example of an arms control treaty enhancing cooperation while at the same time no "robbing states of the ability to defend themselves," a key requirement of Schofield (2000) for a viable arms control treaty.

⁶⁸ "Russia Raises...", *Disarmament Diplomacy*, November 2002.

⁶⁹ Interview with Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade official, Ottawa, February 26, 2003. See also Lachowski, 2002.