

6. Before the first practice, procedures and guidelines were drawn up, including an inspection protocol. The first trial inspection then took place in October 1988 and was followed in March this year with a trial inspection of another ammunition storage depot. A note on administrative and other practical aspects of these inspections is contained in the annex to this paper.

7. The remainder of this paper offers some interim observations on challenge procedures in the light of our first two practices. It should be emphasized that the two practices to date have been conducted at facilities which are not particularly sensitive, and are only the first part of a larger programme. Further trials at more security sensitive facilities will be necessary before firm conclusions can be drawn. The United Kingdom plans to hold such exercises later this year.

SOME PROVISIONAL OBSERVATIONS

Definition of challenged facility

8. The effectiveness of the inspection depends partly on the wording of the challenge. A very specific definition of a challenged facility is therefore required. One way forward might be to define the facility by a combination of name, description and map co-ordinates. Our experience shows that precision is necessary in order to avoid arguments over rights of access. More work is needed on guidelines for access to areas outside the designated site, especially neighbouring facilities which are subsequently shown to be closely connected with the challenge facility.

Notice of inspection

9. It is clear that even in as short a period as 48 hours, considerable quantities of ammunition could be shipped out of a storage facility. It might therefore be desirable for an advance party to arrive immediately after the issue of a challenge to seal the facility and monitor movements in and out although there could be significant practical difficulties which would need to be overcome. The question of clean-up times in civil chemical facilities is also relevant in this context.

Size and composition of inspection team

10. It will be difficult for a team of five inspectors to "secure the site" and carry out all their inspection duties on large sites. They might need to be accompanied by a sizeable support staff who could seal the site, monitor movements in and out on a 24 hour basis, assist in the collection and monitoring of samples both on and off site, and provide general administrative services to the inspection team. The use of physical seals on access points to the site (see below) would reduce the demands on inspection manpower but our experience suggests that for very large sites five inspectors might not be sufficient.

11. The resource implications of a large support staff and the earlier arrival of an advance party both for the technical secretariat and for the challenged State would however require further examination and priorities might need to be established.