

and in some instances the food is stored up in hermetically sealed chambers where it can be of no use to the wasp larvae. Thus the wasp does not always show the knowledge of an experienced entomologist, or even of an ordinary carpenter. Now, this is just what might be expected, if instinct is a product of evolution, depends largely on inherited structure and chemical changes, and is, in consequence, to a certain extent, imperfect, and not always purposeful. Bergson seems to think that such instinct is more marvellous than other organic products, partly, perhaps, *because it discloses a resemblance to intelligent human activities*. He shows himself to be a genuine metaphysician of the old school by resorting to a method of "interpretation" and supposing "a sympathy between the *Ammophila* and its victim, which teaches it from within, so to say (!), concerning the vulnerability of the caterpillar." (C. E., 183.) He thus indulges in one of those pretended explanations which consist in a purely verbal description and is almost as weak as the method of ascribing the soporific qualities of opium to a *virtus dormitiva*. To explain the origin of the sympathy, which operates like a *deus ex machina*, is at least as difficult as to explain the instinct on psycho-biological grounds. But metaphysicians like Bergson will adopt any suggestion, however lacking in evidence, rather than admit a lack of knowledge. To suspend judgement or admit ignorance is irreconcilable with the everlasting *Hang der Metaphysik* to account for everything, including the metaphysician himself.* Bergson believes that it is better to go back to the Aristotelian theory of nature rather than to stop short before instinct as before an unfathomable mystery. That is to say, better adopt an untenable theory than none. The alternatives are not exhaustive. Leaving out of account what comparative psychology has to say on the subject, I should prefer Addison's statement to Bergson's speculations

* A critic of Bergson has given a delightful argument on Bergson's method to show that the philosopher cannot exist, because, assuming the infinity of space, it can be shown that he cannot be in Paris or at any definite place in the universe. This argument, although fallacious, is no worse than what Bergson sometimes employs in the interest of his own speculations.