

him to immigrate, promising him thereby a great improvement in his circumstances. Improvement of circumstances, arousing within him its appropriate subjective feeling or feelings, is a strong motive to him to emigrate. Under the impulse of great desire he is anxious to emigrate, but is still in a state of irresolution or indecision. He thinks of all the motives in favour of emigration, a splendid climate, a better house, a better farm, a better living, etc., to each of which his subjective feelings respond very cordially. A subjective resolution or consent arises within him to all these; but on the other hand, he shall have to leave his parents, his friends, the land of his fathers, etc., behind: these are motives appealing to his subjective feelings, over which he is yet unable to arouse or obtain the feeling of consent. Knowing that all motives cannot be gratified, he tries to obtain a feeling of consent over such as he should have to lose, by comparing them with such as he should acquire. He succeeds with some, but is unable to do so with others. He is still in a state of subjective irresolution or indecision. Continuing the effort, however, from day to day, weakening the force of some motives by familiarizing himself with the thought of their loss, strengthening the force of others by thinking of them more frequently, he finds the number of those over which he is unable to obtain a feeling of consent in favour of those with which they are compared, gradually becoming fewer or weaker, until at last he is able to arouse in himself the feeling of consent over them all in favour of those which induce him to go to America; and in consequence, he proceeds to regulate his subjective acts in accordance with his subjective resolution.

We need not multiply illustrations of this kind, as every person's experience makes him much more familiar with examples illustrative of this than with the underlying principles of volition, which we have been at some pains to explain.

It is here necessary to remark, that as there are just three subjective states of the will in reference to any particular act, namely, resolution or consent, non-consent, and irresolution or indecision, there are only three conceivable movements of the will:—(1) a movement from a subjective state of irresolution, or from one of non-consent to one of resolution, in other words, consent; (2) a movement from a subjective state of consent, or from one of irresolution, to one of non-consent; (3) or a movement from a subjective state of consent, or from one of non-consent, to one of irresolution.

One might imagine that there would be a difference in the manner in which these three movements are effected. Such is not the case. There is in reality only one mode of operation, namely, that which we have specially described in the preceding pages, and so fully illustrated.

Every movement takes place in a manner precisely uniform, and exactly in accordance with the rules and the illustrations, or examples, which we have given. But we go further than this, and assert that there is virtually and truly, not merely only one mode, but also only one movement, in a process of volition, namely, the first, or that movement which we have specially described and illustrated. For as we have stated from time to time, the Ego invariably, prompted by the impulse of motives, starts in a subjective state of irresolution or non-consent, and seeks to arouse or obtain a subjective resolution or consent to their gratification; consent or resolution being the only subjective feeling that can act on the subjective energy.

The other two movements, then, are only the converse side of this movement. As they never could take place except when there are opposing motives, this truth will be plain from the following facts:—Consent to an act is just non-consent to its opposite, and non-consent to an act is just consent to its opposite; consequently, when we pass from a subjective feeling of non-consent to one class of motives, to one of consent to the same class, it is virtually passing from a subjective feeling of consent to the opposite class of motives, to one of non-consent to the opposite class. The second movement, then, from a subjective feeling of consent to one of non-consent, is the converse side of the regular and general one, namely, that from a subjective feeling of irresolution or of non-consent to one of consent; in other words, it is virtually the same. The third, or the other movement referred to, is also virtually the regular or general one which we have given, with a failure to arouse a subjective feeling of consent to the opposing motives on either of the sides.

In addition to these facts, we need state only further, that as the impulse of motives is always to urge the Ego from a subjective feeling of irresolution or of non-consent to one of consent to their gratification or pacification; and as it is also only the subjective feeling of consent that controls the subjective energy, there is therefore only one movement in the process of volition, namely, the regular and general one which we have been at special pains to describe.

In drawing the discussion of this subject to a termination, we would remark that the process of volition may be carried on entirely by ourselves, or it may be carried on within us by the agency of another person, who seeks to persuade us to a particular line of conduct. We are all familiar with the rhetoric of the lawyer as he strives to obtain a favourable verdict