

slowly as to be almost imperceptible. It was encouraging for instance that there was in fact a proximity of views evident in the two plans. The Canadian initiative in drawing attention to these had been most helpful. Immediate substantial results could not repeat not be expected considering that since World War II over a trillion and a half dollars had been spent in the arms race. We had to be prepared, he was convinced, for a very long haul. Nevertheless, in the long run, taking account of the Western economic pressures and the potential pressures from the East, the Russians were bound to become interested in eventually reaching agreement. This when combined with the Western resolve that the arms race must be stopped and reversed and a similar desire on the part of the neutrals augured well for the future.

2. Foster said that USA had been “pleasantly surprised” at the general behaviour of the “eight.” By and large they had done their homework well and were already well on the way to mastering the subject. In particular, the performance of the Nigerian, UAR and Swedish delegations indicated a high degree of sophistication with respect to this knotty subject. The Burmese had perhaps not repeat not lived up to expectations but this arose more from distractions in Burma than from lack of interest in the subject matter. The Ethiopians had been, on the whole, rather disappointing and Lall of India did not repeat not seem to be following a strictly neutral course between the two sides. Nevertheless, all told, the addition of the eight to the disarmament negotiations was proving to be helpful and worthwhile.

3. Meanwhile, as we knew, the Geneva Conference would recess for a month on Friday (June 15). Our own hope that a recess might not repeat not have been necessary was appreciated by Foster. For its part USA would have at least preferred that the recess be postponed so that they might, in the meantime, have gone more fully into USA plan before the recess. Nevertheless, the recess would provide an opportunity for the Western members of the Committee to review the course of the Conference thus far and to consider future courses of action. To this end Foster said that it had been suggested at a meeting of the Four on June 12 in Geneva that the Western Four might foregather in Washington during the week before the resumption of the Conference in Geneva for the purpose of exchanging views. (I interjected that I believed you would welcome this proposal.) It had not repeat not been specified at what level these meetings might take place but it could be at Heads of Delegation meeting or at such other level as the other three might wish. In any event, Foster said that he himself and also Arthur Dean would be available to attend.

4. On the substance of general disarmament, Foster doubted that USA would be in a position to make any far reaching modifications of its existing proposals. Further studies were being made of verification which was at the crux of the East-West difficulties. USA was confident that, given Soviet willingness to negotiate seriously, it would be possible to reach agreement on a scheme of verification which would not repeat not involve serious intrusion, with which the USSR appeared to be obsessed. USA might also have some suggestions to make concerning the transition and foreign bases. In general, he thought USA would not repeat not be in a position to do much more than “shine up” existing proposals. He added, incidentally, that USA would take advantage of the recess to call a meeting of the President’s Civilian Advisory Committee on Disarmament including among others John J. McCloy, Kistiakowsky (formerly President Eisenhower’s Scientific Adviser) Roger Blough (President, USA Steel Corporation) and Herman Phleger (former State Department Legal Adviser).

5. On the possibility of a nuclear test ban, Foster thought there was some prospect of reaching agreement. The proposal of the eight neutrals had resulted, he said, in some narrowing of the gap which had previously existed between the two sides. At least the Russians now had accepted the general idea of an “international umpire” in the event of suspicious events being detected. There was still, of course, a major reconciliation involved between the Soviet view that verification process in a nuclear test ban should be permissive and USA position that the