

referring to the possibility of going to a higher authority for a decision on some knotty point.

30. From time to time therefore the Japanese delegation seemed to be testing the limits of United States' resistance to Japanese interests. To some extent this was being done for interests beyond fisheries. Attached to the Japanese delegation but unnamed, was a group of post-war diplomats who were having their initial experiences in international negotiations. This group of onlookers swelled in numbers on each occasion in which there were differences between Canada and the United States. Mr. Tsuchiya of the Foreign Office confided their interest in Canadian-American relations, in watching how the Canadians handled themselves in the face of American opposition, how they resisted United States pressures, and sought to effect United States compromises. Tsuchiya mentioned that after ratification of the Peace Treaty, Japan under its Security Pact with the United States, feels that her relations with the great power may be in some respects like those of Canada. Hence the interest of the Foreign Office in watching every move made between Canadians and Americans.

31. Another circumstance affected the whole Japanese thinking on this treaty. For the immediate future, their most important relations in fisheries are likely to be with Asiatic countries, with Russia and China, with Korea, with Indonesia, Australia, all of whom desire a rigorous exclusion of Japanese fishing vessels from their adjacent seas. The Japanese had therefore to test the principles of the United States draft and its exceptions against all of these possible Asiatic relations, to ensure that no part of this treaty — in principles, in exceptions, in enforcement regulations or in the Commission structure — could possibly be used as a precedent against them in treaties with any of these other countries.

32. The current attempt to codify Japanese laws in general added to this problem. Since this treaty will become Japanese law, any of its clauses might become part of a code that they would have to apply to other fisheries treaties.

33. The condition mentioned in the previous paragraphs produced another result which in turn had features of its own. While there was a constant problem of getting accurate translations between the English language and Japanese, the Japanese delegation were obviously aiming at imprecision in the final wording of clauses. This was being done purposely so that they could later interpret the treaty and its terms with some degree of latitude. On one point on which there was a sharp difference between the Japanese and the Canadians, they suggested we leave the English text in a way that would suit us while they would make the Japanese text conform to their own wishes! This honest dishonesty prevented our congratulating ourselves on our moral superiority but led us to insist that no clause in the treaty should read in opposite ways in the different languages. The incident added zeal to the efforts of the Americans and ourselves to see that language and translation would be as precise as possible. The senior translator at the Canadian Legation, Mr. Iwamoto, was very helpful in this particular.

34. This kind of thing, and the subsequent struggle for unanimity of understanding and identity of language in the two texts helps to explain the protracted negotiations.