

tial aid, this great "National Undertaking, calculated very greatly to advance the commercial and political interests, both of the British Provinces in North America, and of the Mother Country," to use the language of the British Cabinet in 1851, will never be accomplished.

It will not, however, fail because Her Majesty's North American subjects are too short-sighted to comprehend its important national bearings, or too indifferent to the general welfare to care for its accomplishment, or too much occupied with their own more immediate concerns, to be willing to contribute towards it. It is because of the higher and larger influences of the work, as much as in consideration of local benefits, that we urge the undertaking on Her Majesty's Government.

In case of hostilities with the United States, the facility which a Railroad from Halifax through British territory would afford for the transport of troops and munitions of war, would be of incalculable advantage; and, in a mere financial point of view, would probably, in a few months, repay all that the Government might have contributed. In connection with large steamers on the ocean, enabling the Government to transport in a few weeks, on any threatened emergency, an Army to any point of Her Majesty's North American possessions, it would render unnecessary the constant maintenance of a large military force within them.

Nor is it the least of the advantages that would result from this facility, that the knowledge of its existence would tend to avert hostilities that otherwise might grow out of a sense of comparative impunity, attendant on aggressive movements. Not less than seventeen lines of American Railroads lead through the United States to the borders of Canada, and give the means of rapid hostile approach,—not a single line of British Railroad connects the Provinces together, or affords communication from the Atlantic shore through national territory. Of the three routes by which Canada is reached, viz., by the St. Lawrence, by lines of Railroad that traverse the United States, and through the wilderness, the latter would alone be available for the transport of troops or munitions of war, in the case of hostilities, commenced or threatened at the beginning of winter.

On such an event, the spectacle might be presented, of a large and prominent Colonial possession of the Empire assailed by a superior force and cut off,—except at great exposure, expense, and delay,—from effectual aid, not only from the Parent State, but from the adjoining Colonies.

None more than the inhabitants of Nova Scotia, appreciate the advantages of peaceful relations with the United States. They, however, who are placed in close proximity, are less credulous than others may be, as to the impossibility of hostilities between the two Powers. And yet it is apparent to all, that the foreign relations of no government are so subject, as those of the United States, to the influence of popular impulse or of party interests. This consideration, illustrated as it recently was by the enlistment dispute, sufficiently indicates that a policy, founded on the assumed impossibility, or high improbability, of hostilities with that people, must be deficient in the forecast that seeks, by timely and suitable preparation, to prevent aggression, or successfully to repel it.

The great work we advocate is as necessary to enable Her Majesty's North American Colonies to promote their mutual progress in peace, as it is requisite for their common defence in war. It is almost impossible for those at a distance to comprehend how much New Brunswick and Nova Scotia are unallied to Canada by those bonds of mutual intercourse that might be expected to subsist between Colonies of the same Empire, placed together under circumstances that make a close union their common interest and security.

With the United States, Canada has unlimited means of communication, by lakes, rivers, canals and railroads; and extensive and intimate intercourse is the result. The capital of New Brunswick, connected with the United States by a short and easy navigation,