

rejected by Egypt which had been asked to withdraw its forces beyond the Suez canal; and following that rejection the United Kingdom and French forces intervened by air and later on the ground.

At that time far from gratuitously condemning the action the Canadian government said through the Prime Minister and indeed through myself, that we regretted the necessity for the use of force in these circumstances; and these circumstances, I confess, included an element of complete surprise on our part at the action taken.

There was no consultation--and this has been pointed out--with other members of the Commonwealth and no advance information that this very important action, for better or for worse, was about to be taken. In that sense consultation had broken down between London and Paris on the one hand, the Commonwealth capitals and--even more important, possibly,-- Washington on the other.

Nevertheless, instead of indulging then or since in gratuitous condemnation we expressed our regret and we began to pursue a policy, both here by diplomatic talks and diplomatic correspondence, and later at the United Nations, which would bring us together again inside the western alliance and which would bring about peace in the area on terms which everybody could accept.

Canadian Policy

Our policy, then, in carrying out these principles was to get the United Nations into the matter at once; to seek through the United Nations a solution which would be satisfactory to all sides. In adopting that policy it was obviously impossible for us to act at the United Nations Assembly in any way which we could not justify under our obligation as signatories to the United Nations Charter.

Our policy with regard to this matter as a member of the United Nations was to try to stop the fighting through the United Nations. How could we follow any other course without betraying our obligations under the Charter? But we were also anxious, as were many other delegates to the United Nations although not all of them, to avoid the creation of a vacuum of chaos in that part of the world after the fighting had stopped; and we realized if that test as well as the test of stopping the fighting could not be met, the United Nations would have failed.

Also at the United Nations we were anxious to make sure--we mentioned this in our statements down there--that the situation leading up to the aggression should be given due consideration, and that constructive action should be taken to prevent such a situation recurring again, that we should go deeper into this matter than merely into the facts of military action. I hope that will be done quickly at the United Nations Assembly. There are already two resolutions on the order paper for that purpose.