

In addition, there was quite clearly different perceptions that coloured intelligence gathering and its interpretation. By and large the UN and most countries had built up over the years a perception that everything happening was merely evidence of an ongoing and at time messy civil war. The human rights violations by the government were only seen as quantifiably different from those of the RPF so as to not substantially differentiate the two warring parties. More insidious and undeniably racist was the perception that such human rights violations were certainly horrendous but acceptable in the African context.

The Rwandan government played on that perception and was ably abetted by the French government who quite apart from failing to criticising their ally for documented massacres since 1990, acted more as apologist and saw this as more of a quid pro quo for RPF attacks and atrocities. This same attitude was evidenced by the Special Representative of the Secretary General, M. Booh Booh, He was admittedly close to the RG and reported events following April 6th as simply a resurgent civil war and recommended the UN halt the advance of the RPF. That attitude and his general incompetence resulted in his being quietly exiled to Nairobi until his term ended.

This widespread perception by most countries would explain the amazing lethargy of the world community during the first week and for many during the second week of the crisis. Accusations of genocide were initially dismissed, and only repeated accusations by reputable individuals and organizations started to overcome that initial bias.

Many commentators felt that this was clearly the attitude of the US State Department, and that it was only after strong pressure by US NGOs such as Human Rights Watch and the Lawyers Committee in tandem with the CNN factor that they began to admit the humanitarian and genocidal aspects of the incoming intelligence. Paradoxically the very seriousness of the crime of genocide worked against countries officially recognizing their mistake. Accepting that genocide was occurring would have certainly imposed moral obligations to intervene, and many argued that it would impose legal obligations on the 101 states that have ratified the Genocide Convention.

There is a critical **second half** to any successful early warning mechanism, for the collection of intelligence is but the first and often the more frequently attained half. This was true over Rwanda where groups and individuals both within and outside of the UN had collected the substantial intelligence and themselves were clearly cognizant of the seriousness of the warnings. The second half, where key decision makers were 'undeniably' aware of this intelligence, was not as clearly attained. The term 'undeniably' refers to those decision makers both being made aware of relevant intelligence, and others knowing they had been made aware, so that deniability real or otherwise was no longer an option.

One example is the black hole into which the Special Rapporteur Ndaiye's report (footnoted below) had been dropped after being tabled with the Commission on Human Rights. There is no