

these weapons in the Register. Furthermore, despite a wide-ranging set of suggestions as to next steps, no mention was made of the Register. Including this class of weapon in the Register will entail the justification of this measure, and not just adding on what is a very different class of weapon.

*Clarity of procedures.* Register performance has been affected both positively and negatively by the clarity of procedures and the role of UNDDA in this process. The wider variety of small arms and light weapons, and the wider variety of modes of transfer, make this problem more critical for small arms.

*Capacity.* Given the political will, most states now have the capacity to report to the Register on an annual basis. This was not always the case, but there have been improvements in national capacity procedures. The case of small arms and light weapons is qualitatively different. First, most of the weapons being transferred now are not new production, but rather surplus weapons. The accountability for such weapons is notoriously low when compared to new production. This can be seen in the various proposals for marking weapons, in the OAS Treaty and in the UN Firearms Protocol. Most states have balked at the prospect of marking used weapons, since they know how difficult it is to manage these stocks. Canada's new laws requiring national registration of weapons has demonstrated that monitoring this class of weapon at a level whereby a State could report to the Register its exports and imports will prove to be a very expensive and difficult. Attempt to do this, given the declining interest in the Register, will likely be counter-productive.

*Incentives for States to Participate.* A major problem with the Register is that there is little incentive for many states to participate, since they neither import, produce or export any weapons in the seven categories of major conventional weapons. Much effort has been expended in an attempt to get these states to submit "nil" reports. Many of them do not see the point. With small arms and light weapons, the problem of incentives is different. Here *most* states at least import these weapons for their legitimate self defense and , in some instances, also for repressing/controlling/combating their own people or groups operating within their own borders. As the debates in the General Assembly on small arms have shown, many states are clearly not anxious to extend any kind of arms control, disarmament or transparency to this class of weapon. They view internal security as just that, an internal matter not within the purview of the United Nations, and during debates they often cite the UN Charter in this regard.

*Different impact.* Finally, small arms and light weapons will not be easily integrated into the Register because the concern which underlay the drive to create the Register, (interstate conflict fought by regular armies) is very different from the consequences of small arms as a tool of warfare. In the latter, the problems are much more humanitarian, in the form of casualties to civilians, increased poverty due to the cessation of development projects, and the general militarization of society. The solution to these problems goes far beyond arms control and disarmament, and needs to be addressed in a comprehensive and