

Each service now makes claims that it can deliver the sought-after decisive, cost-effective and bloodless blow. All three services have created new organizations for doctrine development. "In fact" observes Blank, "this atavistic squabbling contradicts the U.S. armed forces professed creed of jointness."⁴⁰

That there remains considerable academic debate about the RMA's technological, doctrinal and organizational aspects is not surprising. Similar debate has accompanied most major changes in the nature of warfare. Some of the predictions came true, others did not. In the absence of a major war involving states with RMA capabilities, much will remain in the realm of speculation, however well informed. The inconclusiveness of this debate notwithstanding, the RMA has already had an impact on the way states perceive the international security environment, including the future of arms control.

ARMS CONTROL AND VERIFICATION: THE LESSONS OF THE COLD WAR

Absent from much of the debate over the RMA's meaning for the future of warfare is its impact on arms control. This has two dimensions. First can the elements associated with the RMA be subject to any kind of arms control regime? Second, how will the RMA affect efforts to control WMD? In considering these questions an overview of the lessons of the Cold War is instructive.

The advent of nuclear weapons at the end of the Second World War escalated the destructive potential of warfare to a new level and also gave impetus to the search for means to control this "absolute weapon." In theory, given the nature of nuclear weapons, it might have seemed that they would have been readily amenable to arms control for several reasons. First of all, relative to conventional weaponry, the number of nuclear weapons, and the platforms to deliver them was relatively small. Second, given the destructive power of a single device, the addition of more weapons to the arsenals did not seem to logically enhance national security. Third, while both the Soviets and Americans certainly planned to use these weapons in war, their utility was always circumscribed. Beyond deterrence, and if deterrence failed, the waging of central war, it was never clear how nuclear weapons could be employed effectively. As Henry Kissinger is said to have remarked when accused of giving the Soviets too many weapons during the Strategic Arms Limitation (SALT) negotiations, "What in the name of God is superiority? What is the significance of it, politically, militarily, operationally? What do you do with it?"⁴¹

But if the nature of nuclear weapons seemed to make them so logically ripe for arms control, those same characteristics militated against control. Given the small numbers, it was difficult to

⁴⁰ *Ibid*, p. 136.

⁴¹ As quoted in Laurence Martin, "The Role of Military Force in the Nuclear Age," in Laurence Martin, Ed., *Strategic Thought in the Nuclear Age* (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1979), p. 7