It was against this backdrop that one could understand the drive by many less-developed states to create indigenous arms industries. Once the decision to stimulate an arms industry was taken, the same pressures for exports that existed in middle-tier states emerged. Arms exports could reduce unit costs, create and preserve skilled jobs, and spread research and development costs. In fact, these pressures were often more intense because the less-developed state's economy was unable to sustain high levels of research and development spending and the domestic military market was usually limited. Finally, the need to import many of the components used to produce weapons meant that the scarce foreign exchange that was spent must be recouped through export sales.

## **Discussion and Questions**

Jagat Mehta, the discussant for Dr. Treddenick's paper and a former Indian Foreign Secretary, suggested that the militarization of the Third World that resulted from this approach to development and security was counter-productive: it did *not* reduce uncertainty or increase security for citizens of Third World states. The notions of continuing conflict that arose from the Cold War and that influenced thinking in the Third World had produced a narrow view of how states could guarantee the security of their citizens: through military capability and power. Yet the ability of states to guarantee security through military strength had declined.

He echoed the belief that the industry-led development strategies that had been followed by many Third World states over the past 20 years had been failures, especially in African states that neglected agricultural development and other more traditional sectors. Thus both perceived linkages (the link between self-reliance in arms production and political independence and national security, and the link between arms production and industrial development) were mistaken.

Finally, he suggested that Third World states should search for regional diplomatic solutions to the problems of insecurity that they faced, rather than attempting to become regional hegemons. The attempt to measure status and power through traditional indices such as arms production was mistaken and only led to self-perpetuating militarization.

During the question period Dr. Klare pointed out that Dr. Treddenick's scenario might replicate the logic behind decisions to produce arms in the Third World and the dreams of the policy makers, but that it did not seem to reflect the reality faced by developing world arms producers.