

It seems to me that a careful reading of this report indicates that these measures—some of them would perhaps appear to be conclusions rather than measures—include the following:

First, full respect for, full implementation of and a reaffirmation of the Armistice Agreement of 1949 which remains in force and the first article of which assimilates the agreement to a non-aggression pact providing for mutual and full abstention from belligerent acts;

Second, the restoration of the legal position of control in the Gaza strip and the recognition that any change in this position—a position which has practical and humanitarian as well as legal aspects—can only be brought about through a settlement between the parties. The Secretary-General recognizes that the deployment of the United Nations Emergency Force in Gaza on any wider basis than its deployment along the Armistice line in the Sinai Peninsula would require the consent of Egypt under the Armistice Agreement. He also points out, however, in his report—and I quote from that report—that “the development of the situation in Gaza may require special attention and may impose added responsibilities on the United Nations” in particular in regard to refugees.

The third measure from this report is the deployment of UNEF on both sides of the demarcation line, to prevent incursions and raids across that line.

Fourth, El Auja to be demilitarized in accordance with the Armistice Agreement and Israeli and Egyptian forces not to take positions in contravention of that agreement;

Fifth, the assumption by the Emergency Force of the supervisory duties of the Truce Supervisory Organization;

Sixth, formal assurance from the parties concerned to desist from raids and to take active measures to prevent incursions;

Seventh, pending determination of the legal position of these waters, innocent passage through the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba in accordance with the recognized rules of international law, which passage is not to be interfered with by the exercise of any claim to belligerent rights;

The eighth and final measure which I have drawn from the report is that Israeli troops, on their withdrawal from the Sharm al-Shaikh area are to be followed by UNEF in the same way as in other parts of Sinai. The Force is not to be deployed there, as the Secretary-General points out, in such a way as to protect any special position on controversial questions, although, at least transitionally, it may function—or special United Nations observers may function—in support, and only in support, of mutual restraint and in maintaining quiet.

In these resolutions we are giving the United Nations Emergency Force very important functions in the pacification of the area. Perhaps it is already authorized to perform many of these functions. I agree, for instance, with the representative of Australia that in accepting the Secretary-General's second report on the establishment of the Emergency Force we have already, and with the consent of the Government of Egypt, authorized the Force to help maintain quiet after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian troops and to secure compliance with the other terms of the resolution of 2 November 1956. Whether the new functions we are suggesting require, in whole or in part, a new resolution of the Assembly is perhaps not very important now because such a resolution is before us, which is designed to remove any doubts on this score. In so far as is necessary, new arrangements will have to be worked out by agreement with Egypt and with Israel.

In this connection, the scope and the nature of Egypt's earlier consent was brought up yesterday by the representative of Australia and referred to by more than one speaker this afternoon. On that point the Secretary-General made, I think, an important clarification yesterday when he said: “To all the extent that movements of the United Nations Force are supposed to follow from the duties of the Force in relation to the cease-fire and withdrawal, the matter ... has been regarded as non-controversial as it is covered by Egypt's general consent while, on the other hand, as regards activities of the United Nations Force which would extend beyond what is covered by this consent, an additional consent has been considered necessary.” (A/PV, 649, p. 46)