

civilization meant a settlement not of wigwams, but of regular "houses and homes." In the Parliamentary Returns for 1870, No. 15, pp. 22-23, the Superior of the Seminary shows that large sums (\$31,851.17 in three years) were spent in sustaining and providing for the mission. The keeping up of the mission becoming every day more onerous, *the produce of the hunt not being sufficient to supply the wants of the Indians, we created farms around our domains.* When these will yield a plentiful crop, they will suffice to meet the expenses of the mission. In the meantime, the Seminary is obliged to advance very large sums of money to keep up, and for the repairs of the establishment of the Lake of Two Mountains. Yet in face of this the Seminary now maintain that these Indians for whom, when Roman Catholics, it felt bound to provide to a large extent, have been nothing more nor less than squatters on its property!

6. The "Historical Notice" mentions as another obligation that it shall "reserve the oaks on those particular concessions partly under cultivation." It omits the important fact that the Deed also contains the following context: "*Which said oak timber His Majesty shall be free to take without being held to pay indemnity.*" In this as in the other omissions, the "Historical Notice" carefully removes all the appearances of Trusteeship, which the imposition of these conditions and obligations clearly infer.

We now come to the second Deed, and herein we find no relaxation of moment, but rather more stringent binding of the Trustees. The "Historical Notice" herein again avoids all allusion to "the Seminary of Paris," epitomizes the "conditions" of paying fealty and homage, and "also at the ordinary charges and obligations of concessions."

It omits all allusion to the important restrictions and obligations imposed. The dishonesty of this may be apparent from two clauses which especially relate to the Indian interests. The obligation in the former Deed to keep house and home, was made still more binding in the second Deed, thus: "that within a year and a day they shall keep and cause to be kept house and home (*feu et lieu*) on said concession, IN DEFAULT WHEREOF THE SAID CONCESSION SHALL REVERT TO HIS MAJESTY'S DOMAIN!" This has a very unlikely look of "absolute proprietorship."

2. The "Historical Notice" is careful to inform us that the pleas for the second grant contained the following:—"And whereas the said gentlemen the Ecclesiastics of St. Sulpice have represented to him that the transfer of the Mission of the Indians from the Island of Montreal to the Lake, the stone church, presbytery and fort of wood which they had built, had caused them a large expenditure over the value of the lands, &c." His Majesty "has discharged the said gentlemen from making the said stone fort," &c., and adds the three leagues in extent, &c. Nothing is here said of the principal plea made by the Seminary to obtain its second grant, contained in the Deed as follows:—"And lastly, that the Indians of the Mission of the Lake being accustomed to often change their place of abode, so as to render the said land more profitable, it would therefore be necessary to extend the said land further," &c.

The "Historical Notice" also omits the obligations of the Seminary to notify the King of mines, ores and minerals found within the concession: of the right of the King to take oak timber without payment; of the fact that the said concessions were "restricted and subject to the above conditions without exception."

It may be said that many of these specifications are only such as were used in grants to Seignors during the French regime. That makes them none the less binding, and had the Seminary wanted to avoid any obligation toward the Indians, no reservation relating to them would have been inserted in the Deed; that is, if the Seminary had been able to secure the grants from the King for its own emolument and advantage—which was not in the least possible. Just as the Jesuits were depositaries of their estates, so was the Seminary. I may point to the facts that not only did it prosecute trespassers as "guardians of the Indians," but it built residences for them, made no opposition to their full and free maintenance from the lands; that in fact, it once fulfilled its appointed duty as Trustees of the Indian reserve. Garneau, the Roman Catholic historian of Canada (vol. 2, pp. 112), says:—"Meantime, despite the ardent wishes of Britain for the destruction of Catholicism that the Jesuits driven out of Paraguay, and expelled from France ever since the year 1762, still maintained their position in Canada, and it required a papal decree issued in 1733 to abolish that order from our country. It was not till this took place that the British Government thought of appropriating their estates, forgetting as it did, that the Jesuits were only the depositaries of that property, since it had been given to them by the King of France for educating the people, and the instruction of the savages of New France. The conduct of the Seminary towards the Indians until a recent date, and the clear reading of the law, applies the same principle of trusteeship to the St. Sulpicians as the intention of the original Deeds of concession.

I do not wish here to convey the idea that the Seminary of St. Sulpice has no legal rights to their possessions in Canada. The object of my articles is to show that they are under serious legal obligations towards the Indians, and to show how they have fulfilled these obligations. In my next paper I will deal with the Ordinance of 1841, and will be careful to examine further the very veracious statements of the "Historical Notice."

W. GEO. BEERS.

ODD QUOTATIONS.—There is a sort of vanity some men have, of talking of, and reading, obscure and half-forgotten authors, because it passes as a matter of course, that he who quotes authors which are so little read, must be completely and thoroughly acquainted with those authors which are in every man's mouth. For instance, it is very common to quote Shakspeare; but it makes a sort of stare to quote Massinger. I have very little credit for being well acquainted with Virgil; but if I quote Silius Italicus, I may stand some chance of being reckoned a great scholar. In short, whoever wishes to strike out the great road, and to make a short cut to fame, let him neglect Homer, Virgil, and Horace, and Ariosto and Milton, and, instead of these, read and talk of Fracastorius, Sannazarius, Lorenzini, Pastorini, and the thirty-six primary sonneteers of Bettinelli;—let him neglect everything which the suffrage of ages has made venerable and grand, and dig out of their graves a set of decayed scribblers, whom the silent verdict of the public has fairly condemned to everlasting oblivion. If he complain of the injustice with which they have been treated, and call for a new trial with loud and importunate clamour, though I am afraid he will not make much progress in the estimation of men of sense, he will be sure to make some noise in the crowd, and to be dubbed a man of very curious and extraordinary erudition.—*Sydney Smith.*

A MODERN 'SYMPOSIUM.'

THE SOUL AND FUTURE LIFE.

(Continued.)

I am too well satisfied with Lord Blachford's paper, and with much that is in the other papers of the September number, to think that I can add anything of importance to them. The little I would say has reference to our actual knowledge of the soul during this life; meaning by the soul what Lord Blachford means, viz., the conscious being, which each man calls 'himself.'

It appears to me, that what we know and can observe tends to confirm the testimony of our consciousness to the reality of the distinction between the body and the soul. From the necessity of the case, we cannot observe any manifestations of the soul, except during the time of its association with the body. This limit of our experience applies, not to the 'ego,' of which alone each man has any direct knowledge, but to the perceptible indications of consciousness in others. It is impossible, in the nature of things, that any man can ever have had experience of the total cessation of his own consciousness; and the idea of such a cessation is much less natural, and much more difficult to realise, than that of its continuance. We observe the phenomena of death in others, and infer, by irresistible induction, that the same thing will also happen to ourselves. But these phenomena carry us only to the dissociation of the 'ego' from the body, not to its extinction.

Nothing else can be credible, if our consciousness is not; and I have said that this bears testimony to the reality of the distinction between soul and body. Each man is conscious of using his own body as an instrument, in the same sense in which he would use any other machine. He passes a different moral judgment on the mechanical and involuntary actions of his body, from that which he feels to be due to its actions resulting from his own free will. The unity and identity of the 'ego,' from the beginning to the end of life, is of the essence of his consciousness.

In accordance with this testimony are such facts as the following: that the body has no proper unity, identity, or continuity through the whole of life, all its constituent parts being in a constant state of flux and change; that many parts and organs of the body may be removed, with no greater effect upon the 'ego' than when we take off any article of clothing; and that those organs which cannot be removed or stopped in their action without death, are distributed over different parts of the body, and are homogeneous in their material and structure with others which we can lose without the sense that any change has passed over our proper selves. If, on the one hand, a diseased state of some bodily organs interrupts the reasonable manifestations of the soul through the body, the cases are, on the other, not rare, in which the whole body decays, and falls into extreme age, weakness, and even decrepitude, while vigour, freshness, and youthfulness are still characteristics of the mind.

The attempt, in Butler's work, to reason from the individuality and indestructibility of the soul, as ascertained facts, is less satisfactory than most of that great writer's arguments, which are, generally, rather intended to be destructive of objections, than demonstrative of positive truths. But the modern scientific doctrine, that all matter, and all force, are indestructible, is not without interest in relation to that argument. There must at least be a natural presumption from that doctrine, that, if the soul during life has a real existence distinct from the body, it is not annihilated by death. If, indeed, it were a mere 'force' (such as heat, light, &c., are supposed by modern philosophers to be, though men who are not philosophers may be excused, if they find some difficulty in understanding exactly what is meant by the term, when used), it would be consistent with that doctrine, that the soul might be transmuted, after death, into some other form of force. But the idea of 'force,' in this sense (whatever may be its exact meaning), seems wholly inapplicable to the conscious being, which a man calls 'himself.'

The resemblances in the nature and organisation of animal and vegetable bodies seem to me to confirm, instead of weakening, the impression, that the body of man is a machine under the government of his soul, and quite distinct from it. Plants manifest no consciousness; all our knowledge of them tends irresistibly to the conclusion, that there is in them no intelligent, much less any reasonable, principle of life. Yet they are machines very like the human body, not indeed in their formal development or their organism—in their laws of nutrition, digestion, assimilation, respiration, and especially reproduction. They are bodies without souls, living a physical life, and subject to a physical death. The inferior animals have bodies still more like our own; indeed, in their higher orders, resembling them very closely indeed; and they have also a principle of life quite different from that of plants, with various degrees of consciousness, intelligence, and volition. Even in their principle of life, arguments founded on observation and comparison (though not on individual consciousness), more or less similar to those which apply to man, tend to show that there is something distinct from, and more than, the body. But, of all these inferior animals, the intelligence differs from that of man, not in degree only, but in kind. Nature is their simple, uniform, and sufficient law; their very arts (which are often wonderful) come to them by nature, except when they are trained by man; there is in them no sign of discourse of reason, of morality, or of the knowledge of good and evil. The very similarity of their bodily structure to that of man tends, when these differences are noted, to add weight to the other natural evidence of the distinctness of man's soul from his body.

The immortality of the soul seems to me to be one of those truths, for the belief in which, when authoritatively declared, man is prepared by the very constitution of his nature.

LORD SELBOURNE.

(To be continued.)

"That which raises a country, that which strengthens a country, and that which dignifies a country—that which spreads her power, creates her moral influence, and makes her respected and submitted to, bends the heart of millions, and bows down the pride of nations to her—the instrument of obedience, the fountain of supremacy, the true throne, crown, and sceptre, of a nation;—this aristocracy is not an aristocracy of blood, not an aristocracy of fashion, not an aristocracy of talent only; it is an aristocracy of Character. That is the true heraldry of man."—*The Times.*