

distinct arguments; and that the premises of the one are intermingled (though not in a confused manner) with those of the other; the conclusion not being expressed in connection with each of the courses of reasoning separately, but being formally deduced, once for all, only after the premises of both arguments have been fully stated. The following scheme, in which the proposition marked *g* is the conclusion, following in a strictly logical manner from the premises of either argument, and therefore legitimately deduced by Plato from the premises of both combined, will make the matter clear.

ARGUMENT I.

- a. What is always moved is immortal.
- b. What is self-moving is always moved.
- c. Every soul is self-moving.

ARGUMENT II.

- c. Every soul is self-moving.
- d. What is self-moving is a principle of motion.
- e. A principle is unproduced.
- f. What is unproduced is indestructible and immortal.

*g.* Therefore every soul is immortal.

The order in which the propositions forming the premises of these arguments are brought forward by Plato is the following:—(a). το γαρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον.—(b). μόνον δὴ το αὐτο κινουν, ἀτε οὐκ ἀπολείπον ἑαυτο, οὐ ποτε λήγει κινουμένον.—(d). τούτο πηγή και ἀρχή κινήσεως.—(e). ἀρχή δε ἀγενήτων.—(f). ἐπειδή δε ἀγενήτων ἐστι, και ἀδιαφθόρον αὐτο ἀναγκη εἶναι.—(c). ἀθάνατον δε πεφασμένον του ὑφ' ἑαυτου κινουμένου, ψυχῆς οὐσίαν τε και λογον τούτων αὐτον τις λεγων οὐκ αἰσχυνεται.

With regard to the expression in (c), ἀθάνατον δε πεφασμένον του ὑφ' ἑαυτου κινουμένου, it may be remarked, that, though the position: *what is self-moving is immortal*, has not been formally and in express terms laid down in the previous part of the argument, propositions have been laid down, viz.: (a) and (b), which logically involve it.

I may add, as Ast, in a note quoted by Bekker, distinguishes between πηγή and ἀρχή in (d), making the former the *principium reale seu materiale*, and the latter the *principium ideale seu formale*, that there is not the shadow of a foundation for the distinction in the writings of Plato. That the alleged distinction was not in Plato's mind when he wrote the passage under consideration, and that it has nothing to do with the course of his argument, is obvious from this, that, while he employs both πηγή and ἀρχή, as if to give fullness