time, the property being assessed in both names, the learned Chief Justice held that the son worked the place merely for the support of the family, and his own expected possession under his father's will, and that he was not entitled to vote.

In the *Brockville Election Case* the learned Chief Justice of the Common Pleas held, that where there was an agreement between the father and the son that the son should have one-third of the crops as his own, and such agreement was *bonâ fide* carried out, the son was entitled to vote.

Again in another case the same learned judge held, that where, for some time past, the owner had given up the entire management of the farm to his son, retaining his right to be supported from the produce of the place, the son dealing with the crops as his own and disposing of them to his own use—the vote was good.

The same learned judge also determined that where a jury would on the evidence be warranted in finding that the crops (say in the year preceding the last assessment) were the property of the voter, the vote would be good.

The general principle guiding these decisions seems to have been that where the agreement between the father and the son was as to a share of the crops, the son should have an actual existing interest in the crops growing and grown, and a power of disposition over the whole or a portion of them, to entitle him to a vote.

And in those cases where the agreement was as to the farm itself or a portion of it, the son should have an occupation, whether as tenant or otherwise, distinct from the father and independent of him, in order to entitle him to a vote.

In the *Glengarry Case*, before Hagarty, C.J. it was alleged, *inter alia*, in the petition, that that the respondent had been guilty of treating contrary to 32 Vic. cap. 21, sec. 61.

It was shewn in evidence, that the respondent had represented the same constituency during the last parliament: that he was a man of liberal habits; that he had on two occasions after addressing a meeting of electors and others, treated all persons present to liquor; that at the time that he so addressed the meetings he had not determined to stand again for the constituency; and that his object in addressing the meetings was, to explain his conduct during the late parliament. His lordship in delivering judgment said: "Under the 61st section of the Act of 1868, I should have had little doubt in deciding that the only consequences under that statute would have been the penalty of $100. The late Act, however, has raised a question as to whether this comes under the head of a corrupt practice, as being an illegal and prohibited act in reference to elections. If it comes under that description, it not only avoids the election, but renders the candidate liable to the grievous personal disabilities set forth in the Act, for the period of eight years. If the case before me turned upon the naked question. whether the matter prohibited by section 61 was under the present law as to corrupt practices, with all its heavy consequences, I should reserve the legal point for the consideration of the court; but, for the purposes of this case, I shall treat it as such, subject to the modification that I think by all fair rules of statutable construction, I am bound to hold that the evidence must satisfy me that what was done, was done corruptly. When the statute says the candidate shall not do a thing with intent to promote his election, I think it must mean something beyond the literal meaning of the words. If he contemplates being a candidate, every step he takes, the issuing of handbills, canvassing of electors, the mere act of travelling to any given point, and a hundred other things, may literally be said to be done with intent to promote his election. When, therefore, a charge like the present is made, I think the evidence must satisfy the judge, beyond reasonable doubt, that the giving of the entertainment was intended directly to influence the electors, and to produce an effect upon the electors. If not so, why were those words introduced? They are quite useless, if it was intended to prohibit the mere giving of entertainmeut to a meeting of electors, absolutely without reference to the giver's intention and design in the act of giving. In short, if the legislature make it a corrupt practice to give entertainment with intent to promote his election, it must, in my judgment, compel a decision that the intent to promote must be a corrupt intent, in the legal sense of the term as hereinafter explained. I am dealing with a statute avowedly in its preamble aimed at corrupt practices, which Act at the same time pointedly omits all mention of treating from