

to carry out the terms upon which he received this money. My real difficulty in this case arises as to the actual legal authority of the Attorney-General, acting on behalf of the public or any section of the public, to compel a school section to take over a property which a majority of them have declared at a legal meeting of the section they do not want.

In *Attorney-General v. City of Halifax*, 36 N. S. R. 177, two of the learned Judges (Townshend and Meagher, JJ.), laid down the principle that the Attorney-General may intervene only "when any corporation is doing acts detrimental to the public welfare or hostile to public policy." The question seems to be in all cases whether the corporation is acting within its corporate powers. If it is, then the Attorney-General may not interfere. This proposition, I think, is sound, but the question I have to determine is whether the majority of the ratepayers at the school meeting of 1909 were acting within their rights, or in accordance with their legal obligations. Assuming that the house so purchased for the Sisters became the property of the school section, on the departure of the Sisters, I am not quite able to see by what right a majority of the ratepayers could by resolution give it away. Certain clearly defined things they can do. They can vote any sum they think fit for school purposes. They can choose their trustees and, perhaps, vote to rescind a contract if it appears more advantageous to do this than to carry it out. They might even vote to refuse to accept an offer to donate property to the section with or without conditions. But this does not appear to me to be the present case. If this money was given upon trust to buy a building for a large sum of money for the use of A. while A. should continue to occupy it, and when A. left it should belong to the school section, then I know of no power vested in a mere majority of the ratepayers to ignore the trust and instruct the trustees, who are the corporation, to cease proceedings to enforce it. I think the trustees would have been entirely within their rights to have ignored the action of the majority and gone on with their action. If this be so, how can the interests of a minority of the ratepayers be affected or destroyed by the illegal action of the majority. It will be conceded that a majority of the ratepayers of a school section, a majority of the council of a municipal corporation, or a majority of the shareholders of