

ticularly as time went on, it was our conclusion that given the possible surveillance American passports would have, that it was preferable that our guests leave by Canadian passports. They had passports in hand by mid-January.

Approximately the third week in January, we received an unidentified phone call saying that the caller was aware the we were harbouring the house guests. At that point, we began to look seriously at the preferable date for departure.

Question: What date was that, sir?

Answer: That was about January 19.

About January 19, again, it appeared as if several newspapers, magazines were also aware of the story, and although the concern was not that it would be prematurely broken by the press, there was just the higher risk and incidence of possibly word being revealed either in Ottawa, Washington, New York or Tehran itself. So the decision was made. I proposed to the minister that we should proceed before the end of the month. The concurrence was received.

We had cut down the staff from say last February as of the revolution because of the lack of activity primarily in the commercial section. But starting in mid-January we began to gradually phase out all officers except for the four remaining, that was Miss Dollimore, my secretary, Mr. Lucy, the first secretary political, Miss O'Flaherty, the communicator and Sergeant Gauthier, the security guard.

Our friends left on Monday, January 28. The remainder of us left on the afternoon of January 28.

I will just make one other comment, and then some questions, or you may want to go over the dates again. But I am talking often times, say, in terms of recommendations, conclusions reached. I would like to stress that the network was almost an ever-revolving one between myself, to Ottawa, Ottawa then to our embassy in Washington possibly, their advice received back here in Ottawa considered and then again gone over with me. So most of the decisions taken were understood by all three locations.

The timing and what-have-you, because of being located in Tehran, was largely in my hands as far as the proposal to make.

Q. You have already touched on my question a little bit at the end, but I wonder if I could ask you to go into it in a little more detail. That is, I am wondering about the decision-making process in what you have described here, particularly the lines of communication between you, Canada, the U.S., back and forth. Who called the shots? Or who had input, and that sort of thing.

A. I think leading to that question is, again, why the departure time. I think you can say three questions.

One is that the six people were always in remarkably good spirits. You have got probably the six best read foreign service officers now. I would nominate any

one of them for the world Scrabble champions. Some of our carpets are a bit threadbare by pack back and forth, but other than that they were in very good spirits right to the end. However, when it appeared that it would be some time possibly, it seemed to be opportune to move when the mood was right.

The political situation at that time in Tehran was uncertain, so there was no reason at that point, in an event, to wait for resolution.

Now, the proposals as to when we should move when to take place, were from Tehran. These were made to the Department of External Affairs. They were then discussed with Washington. That is the general sequence.

Q. That covers the actual movement. I guess what I am thinking about is: surely there must have been some discussion about what happens if we are caught — what do we do. I assume everything was going by code. What happens if the code is broken, and, I know, what sort of assistance might have been available?

A. We had talked to other friendly embassies in Tehran in case something should go awry. We had an identified villa nearby my residence which could have been used as a fall back. The codes and the communications we felt were 100 per cent secure, so we had no problem in that light. So although we did have

