

follow, Andrei Sakharov's warning notwithstanding. They are wise because they are the only ones civilized men can follow in the nuclear age.

This is not to say that they will be efficacious, because the differences at the heart of the matter are fundamental and have to do with one's conception of the nature of man. It is old-fashioned to make this assertion but, if it is true, no amount of arms reduction or travelling or trading will modify it very much. Change, if it comes, will come from within the societies concerned and no army will stop it or any outside force create it. It is to be hoped that it will come gradually, though that seems unlikely. In any event, as it gains momentum, the test of statesmen in the West will be to resist the temptation to meddle, something their Soviet counterparts find so difficult. If that temptation cannot be resisted, Giraudoux's pessimism may well be vindicated.

As I review what I have written, I am impressed by its arrogance, particularly at a time when a distinguished social scientist can assert that we do not know the rate at which the economy grew last year, when governments cannot predict energy supplies with any assurance for a few months and when even the future of our food supply is in some doubt. It is not a world in which a broad analysis of global trends is a comfortable task. Furthermore, my remarks may seem to reflect on the diligent efforts of statesmen and officials on both sides to resolve these difficult problems. It seems appropriate, therefore, to conclude with the disclaimer of Descartes that: "I could in no way approve of those rash and reckless individuals who, having been called by neither birth nor fortune to the management of public affairs, are nevertheless constantly reforming them in their mind. And if I thought there was anything in what I have written which might make me suspected of such madness, I would deeply regret its publication."

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of all doms of sound and form and subtlety". We must persevere with them for many reasons, not the least of which is that we may need to know in future that we did our best. In this connection, it is particularly important that we should not impose security restrictions, visa delays, etc., on a *Secundum pro quo* basis. Freedom of movement should remain so. It is not to be bargained with, let others behave as they may. At the same time, we should not delude ourselves into thinking that any rapid or far-reaching results are likely from our efforts in this direction.

Finally, there is the question of trade and economic interdependence. This, it is said, may hasten the liberalization of Soviet society and bring about reforms that would be in the Western interest. It is, of course, equally arguable that our economic co-operation will strengthen the Soviet economy and retard the reform that its current performance suggests is necessary. At any rate, the mechanisms whereby IBM and Occidental Oil will achieve this improbable end have not been very well spelt out. Here again, one can only repeat that it seems a "reasonable hope", if an uncertain prediction, and that increased commerce may provide some identity of interest and some impetus toward change.

Little cause for optimism

It would thus appear that none of the usually-recognized elements in the *détente* offers much cause for optimism. There is a point of view, illustrated by Professor Franklyn Griffiths's excellent article in a previous issue of this journal (*International Perspectives*, September-October 1973), according to which Western policy should avoid antagonizing the Soviet Union, thereby avoiding any strengthening of its conservative elements, should not push Western objectives too hard but should, at the same time, encourage collaborative and reformist trends in the Soviet Union. These seem to be wise courses to

... One should not overrate the degree of stability in international relations. The interests of the superpowers clash in the Far East, Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, Europe and Africa — everywhere, in fact, but Eastern Europe and the Western hemisphere, which seem to be tacitly exempted. The Arab-Israeli conflict was perhaps the most acute of the dangers threatening *détente*, but one could easily think of half a dozen crisis situations which may suddenly erupt....

... *Détente* rests not on a mood, not on goodwill, not on the convergence of systems, not on the sudden conversion of the Soviet leadership from Leninist to Gandhian principles. It rests on a certain equilibrium of forces; once the balance is upset, there will be no *détente*.... (Walter Laqueur, *Director of the Institute of Contemporary History in London*, New York Times Magazine, December 16, 1973.)