

times against each other, why may we not apprehend the possibility of a similar event? A voluntary devolution, or a corrupt and splenetic acquiescence in the absolute empire of one, the common head and king of both, rather than that the Parliament of Great Britain could bear the contradiction of the Irish, or the Irish Parliament submit to the controul of the British.

It is painful to anticipate a danger of such formidable magnitude; but when we have the recent examples of Denmark and Sweden before us—whilst we are overwhelmed with disgrace, and almost by despair in a contest with another part of the empire upon questions originally of less importance, how can we refuse to bear testimony to the hazard of disputing upon speculative rights? and if we confess the hazard, how, without the imputation of extreme political folly, can we encourage the dispute? Nor would it be less absurd, where the established practice has been eminently advantageous to both nations, productive of riches and strength to the one, and of liberty, and the true ends of good government to the other; and where that liberty may be further and effectually secured, either by an alteration in the mode of asking or of granting, to contend, that this practice and establishment

“ would undoubtedly set them, and make use of the unlimited power for the good, and not the harm of his subjects.

“ Not one of the rest spoke a word, or seemed to murmur in the least at what was done; and it is observable, that among so many great men, who a few days before seemed to have spirits suitable to their birth and qualities, none had the courage, during these last three days, either by remonstrance, or by any other way, to oppose in any manner what was doing.”

Account of Denmark, p. 46.