Supply

France. The head of the Socialist International, Willie Brandt, said recently that it has a peculiar value even beyond that of security, and that is, and I quote Mr. Brandt:

A move away from the NATO decision could supply the Soviet Union with an excuse for not negotiating seriously.

It is especially important, Mr. Speaker, that this point be clearly understood. The Soviet Union could have had negotiations on intermediate-range missiles with the West at any time since the NATO decision in 1979. They had no interest in negotiating until last fall at the time when it began to appear to the Soviet Union that the western countries were actually serious about deploying the Cruise and the Pershing. It was only at that time that they even condescended to open negotiations, which began late last year and are now proceeding.

An hon. Member: What about SALT II?

Mr. MacGuigan: The hon. member asks about SALT II. Of course, the Soviets had an incentive to proceed to negotiate SALT II because both sides possessed the same kind of intercontinental ballistic missile. However, the Soviet Union in fact has no incentive to negotiate here because there is nothing on our side that we can give up.

An hon. Member: Trident submarines.

Mr. MacGuigan: I am interested in how the perception of the Canadian socialist is so different from that of the head of the Socialist International, whom they regard as a great authority on most issues of the day. I am interested to know that the NDP rejects the authority of distinguished socialists like Willie Brandt, Chancellor Schmidt and President Mitterrand; they prefer to rely on several Americans who, unlike them, support NATO. Perhaps if they could go along with the fundamental principle of those American senators, then they might be able to present positions which are more readily acceptable to the people of Canada.

Miss Jewett: Why don't you talk about the minority report? You are avoiding it.

An hon. Member: Your logic is wonderful.

Mr. MacGuigan: My logic is irrefutable; that is why they are getting so excited, Mr. Speaker. Noise is the refuge of those with an inability to deal with logic.

An hon. Member: Is that why you are making so much noise?

Mr. MacGuigan: Mr. Speaker, the strategy of suffocation not only remains as a general strategy, but also is consistent with Cruise missile testing, although it has been alleged by the hon. member for New Westminster-Coquitlam (Miss Jewett) on various occasions that there is some fancied incompatibility between the strategy of suffocation and the testing of Cruise missiles in Canada. Mr. Speaker, if we succeeded in having the strategy of suffocation implemented following an international agreement, then we would not need the Cruise missile testing because, of course, there would then be an incompatibility; the right to do it, even the need for it, would be taken away by the

international agreement. But what we have done is to make a standing offer, which we continue to hold out to the world and in particular to the superpowers, where we urge them to take the necessary steps to suffocate the development of new missile systems.

As we said at the time, it is not a strategy of unilateral disarmament. If it were, we would have quite a different kind of policy and government; we would be a government of the kind that the NDP might be. But that is not our policy. Our policy is that we do our best to provide ideals to the world, to work towards those ideals. If those ideals are spurned by other countries, we have to make the best of the real situation which exists. Chancellor Schmidt has this to say at the recent conference of his party in Munich:

I want to say this to those who want to offer unilateral disarmament in the place of mutually binding disarmament agreements. Historical experience shows that one-sided powerlessness never stopped aggression by a force possessing power. This is the experience of neighbours of the Soviet Union, and the case of Afghanistan is still fresh in our minds.

An hon. Member: I agree with the whole thing.

Mr. MacGuigan: I am glad to hear that the hon. member agrees with something his socialist brethren say. Mr. Speaker, it is because the Soviet Union took advantage of détente to invade Afghanistan, create problems in Poland, and build up its intermediate-missile force in the Soviet Union—as the hon. member for Esquimalt-Saanich (Mr. Munro) points out, there are many more examples I could use—it is because the Soviet Union has engaged in this provocative behaviour that this present crisis has arisen. The Soviet Union has not taken seriously what we thought in this country was the spirit of détente. They have used it as a breathing space to further increase their armaments, and to engage in aggressive activities in the world. It is this danger we are responding to.

The difference, I suggest, between these socialists here and the ones in Europe like Brandt, Schmidt and Mitterrand is that those socialists know what it is to live in the woods with the bear. They have to face reality, they have to adopt responsible policies and not just rhetoric. It is because of that, Mr. Speaker, that they came to present us as fellow members of NATO with conclusions which we were glad to accept in 1979, which we are prepared to accept now, and I want to assure the House and the country we will continue to accept. The worst step we could possibly take in the search for peace is to attempt to undermine the confidence of those in Western Europe who stand with us against the dangers from the East.

In conclusion, Mr. Speaker, I would simply say that the important point is not only that we have adequate defence; we must have that, of course. But even more important is that we move towards disarmament with a realistic policy which will provide an incentive to the other side to negotiate. Without that incentive there is no possibility whatsoever of moving towards peace. The goal of the limited strength and radical reductions which we advocate is movement towards world peace.