

tions. It is desirable that our young men should have their names upon the voters' lists as soon as possible after they attain manhood. If a man, otherwise entitled to vote, attains the age of twenty-one, he should be given the right to exercise the franchise as soon as possible, and he should not be deterred for two years afterwards.

Mr. HUGHES. How will you do that if you adopt the provincial lists?

Mr. CHARLTON. You will do it under the provincial law. Whatever mode is adopted by the province for the exercise of the franchise is the law that will apply for the election of members for the Dominion, and if it is a just law in the one case it is a just law in the other. I do not dispute that this House is properly invested with authority as to the trial of the right of its members to sit here, and as to all things relating to the economy of this House. Nevertheless, it must be borne in mind that we are all of us here the representatives of certain ridings. We come from certain provinces, and these provinces are invested by the constitution of the country with the civil right which enables them to secure representation in this Parliament. We represent our provinces here. We are not relieved from responsibility to these provinces; we are not relieved from the duty of looking after the interests of the provinces and the ridings we represent. I have always held that it pertained to the province to say what should be the method by which it should choose its representatives in this Parliament; that that was a civil right of the province; that while we exercised certain functions in the way of determining the qualifications of members of this House, and so forth, yet primarily we are sent here by our ridings, which are different portions of the province, the province being entitled under the British North America Act to be represented in this House, and that Act prescribing the number of representatives which each province should have in this House; and when we are asked: How will you do this or that, how will you have one man one vote in one province and another system in another province? I say do as they do in each province—adopt their franchise for the sake of harmony, and do not adopt a hard and fast rule that may conflict with the rule of the province; do not be guilty of the folly that we perpetrated in 1885 of providing two sets of machinery at enormous cost, perplexing the minds of the people, causing confusion, and in every way working detrimentally to the interests of the country. It may be said: this thing cannot last—you will have to go back to a Dominion franchise.

Some hon. MEMBERS. Hear, hear.

Mr. CHARLTON. "Hear, hear," I hear. Some men are very wise in this matter.

Mr. CHARLTON.

They do not take the pain to look at the experience of other countries in the very same road that we are now travelling. That is of no consequence to them. Here is a law that they placed on the Statute-book in 1885 for a political purpose. It has served its purpose, and they are in favour of that law because it has been a good friend to them; and they say, forsooth, that it cannot be dispensed with. But I know it can be. Our friends have talked of the example of England, and I have pointed out that we have not followed the example of England at all—that the main features of our law are diametrically opposed to the main features of the English law. It is admitted that our federal union here is to some extent a copy of the first great experiment in the formation of a federal union in the history of the world. That experiment was the formation of the federal union of the thirteen colonies that first constituted the United States. That federal union is the example on which we have acted, on which the Australian colonies are about to act, and on which all federated colonies must act. In that example they can copy what is desirable, and avoid what is undesirable. The American people have not passed exactly through our experience, for they have never had what may be termed a national franchise law. They had a national constitutional convention in 1787, after the first Confederation Act had been found ineffectual. One of the first questions to be decided in that convention was, what should be the character of the machinery by which the members of Congress, the President and the Vice-President of the United States should be elected? How should they ascertain and apply the popular will? That question was debated for weeks. Four propositions were made. One was that the states should elect members of Congress as they now elect senators. Another was that each state should determine the mode in which they should be elected, what men should vote and what men should not vote. Another was that the United States should have a uniform franchise law to be applied in all United States elections, which was similar to our own law. That was rejected, as were the other propositions, and the simple solution of the difficulty arrived at was that the lowest form of franchise used in each state, the franchise for the election of members to the most lower branch of the legislature in the state, the most widely-extended franchise, should be the franchise used in United States elections. That law went into operation in 1790; it has been in operation 107 years; and there never has been the slightest friction under it or the remotest expression of a desire to have it changed. It has been recognized through all that period to be essentially just and to be the only form of franchise that could be worked easily, harmoniously and without