

already well known in that country prior to the publication of the white paper. The British report on defence in 1958, however, had the following introductory remark:

This paper reports the progress made in implementing that policy.

That is, the policy which had been announced a year before. Recently another British white paper announced the details of some major changes and reorganization of the British army. No such changes have taken place here because they are not applicable to our organization.

In the report that I made available in April--and it is the type of report that requires some time to prepare-- I endeavoured to set forth our defence policy, to outline how that policy was being carried out, to show the distribution of our forces and to explain briefly the estimates required for this financial year. Amidst all the verbiage that has been uttered since I tabled the report I can find but two or perhaps three points of criticism, and these all affect matters that require major policy decisions. I refer to the re-equipment of the air division in Europe, the defence against the manned bomber at home, and the defence against the ICBM of the future. I have already made mention of the problem of defence against the ICBM and I shall refer later to the defence against the manned bomber.

Air Defence

Hon. members will realize that a decision such as the re-equipment of the air division, involving not only millions of dollars but also our relations with our NATO allies, is not easily arrived at. At the time I tabled the report no such decision has been taken. Now, after the Government has had the opportunity of hearing the views expressed by General Norstad, the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe, and having taken into consideration many other factors including costs, I am in a position to announce that the Government has decided to re-equip the air division of the RCAF. The U.S.S.R. and its satellites have large, mobile and fully equipped forces deployed along the European border of Russia and in the territory between the Russian border and NATO Europe. These deployed and combat-ready Soviet forces would be capable of launching and sustaining for some time a major ground attack against NATO Europe. To prevent the overrunning of NATO Europe it would be essential to defeat enemy forces launching such an attack.

The mobility of enemy forces and the target-information requirements for the effective use of surface to surface missiles, with which the allies are now being armed, clearly indicate a need for aircraft which can penetrate the area between the combat zone and the Russian border for reconnaissance and for strikes on targets of opportunity such as advancing columns of troops.