

political reality. And while Westphalia rightly is understood as a crucial moment in the modern separation of religion and politics in the inter-state system, even here the post-Westphalia dictates of the 17th century represented the codification of developments sparked off during the Reformation and initially verified in the Treaty of Augsburg (1555).¹³

On the other side of the modelled coin, as it were, a range of anomalies and discontinuities are also evident. Thus, while Papal power was certainly curtailed after Westphalia the Holy Roman Empire still retained great authority in many areas of the European Continent, and for all its formalised status the notion of religious freedom was a restricted and fragile one in practice. Likewise, for all the talk of religious and political independence suggested by the Westphalian model it is worth remembering that the resultant sovereignty was restricted to European states (i.e. excluding the peoples of the Ottoman Empire) and that the fundamental prerequisite for freedom in Europe remained that of Christianity.

There is another anomalous dimension of the Westphalian model that is also worthy of note in the present context. It is that the template of state-centric analysis and policy prescription was, from its beginnings, invested with the kind of economic dimensions now associated with the process of (neo-liberal) globalisation. Or, more precisely, from its beginnings International Relations (represented in terms of post-Westphalian statist principles) was always International Political Economy.

The general point, to reiterate it, is that after 1648 there was never a single universally experienced reality within European borders. In particular the post-Westphalian reality for the peoples in the East of the Continent was distinctly different from that of those in its West and along its Atlantic seaboard. In the East, dominated by Russia, Austria and increasingly Prussia the post-1648 experience was essentially that of the pre-Westphalian period. Feudal power relations were the (often brutal) order of the day and, to one degree or another, the traditional structures of monarchical hierarchy, landlord and serf and mediaeval religion continued to characterise the everyday lives of the modern age of International Relations.

In the West, and without for a moment underestimating the absolutist tendencies within some of its territories (eg France) the freedoms of Westphalia served their modern purpose, primarily for those states now energised by bourgeois ambition, growing industrial workforces and a new source of power, centred on naval expansion

¹³For useful discussions of this period and its complexities see, T. Knudson A History of International Relations Theory (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1992) part 2; D. Philpott, "Sovereignty: an Introduction and Brief History", in Journal of International Affairs 48 (2) Winter, 1995: 353-368; and J. Hehir, "Expanding Military Intervention" in Social Research 62 (1) Spring, 1995: 41-52