

Nations. This role must be a pragmatic one that is primarily responsive to the existing requirements of the international community and not constructed on the basis of hypothetical events. Elaborate mechanisms devised to monitor agreements which do not in fact exist as yet, for example, should be avoided. Moreover, consent of all the parties to any agreement to be monitored must remain a prerequisite to United Nations involvement as part of any verification mechanism.

In the view of Canada and the Netherlands, the United Nations could play a constructive role in verification by undertaking the following functions:

1. The development of internationally agreed goals and principles concerning arms control verification, such as through the activities in which the Disarmament Commission has been engaged.
2. The promotion of the exchange and provision of information relevant to the negotiation and the mechanics of verification, so as to function as a verification database or "verification information point" (VIP).
3. The systematic compilation and maintenance of a register of institutions and individuals with relevant expertise in the area of verification, upon whom parties to an agreement could call for services or assistance.
4. The provision of assistance, advice and technical expertise to Member States and in particular their arms control negotiators, on request.
5. Assistance in the organization and conduct of review conferences for existing arms control and disarmament treaties, with the view of improving assessments of the functioning of verification systems.
6. The systematic identification, coordination, conduct and fostering of research into the process, structures, procedures and techniques of verification.