
Synopsis

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The Workshop opened with some welcoming remarks by Canada's Ambassador to the United Nations and to the Conference on Disarmament, de Montigny Marchand. Ambassador Marchand, whose responsibilities include the on-going chemical weapons negotiations in the 40-member Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, outlined the aims and context for the Workshop.

The sessions of the Workshop were organized into three sequential categories of topics: current thinking in the Chemical Weapons negotiations (at the Conference on Disarmament, Geneva); the IAEA safeguards experience; and the applicability of the IAEA procedures and experience to verification of an international agreement to ban chemical weapons.

Current Thinking in the Chemical Weapons Negotiations

Jim Sheaks of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency discussed United States views on chemical weapons. His remarks focussed on describing the "rolling text" as it pertains to areas where progress has been made in the negotiations; the three criteria set by the U.S. for an acceptable chemical weapons agreement; and the seven basic concepts within the "rolling text." He concluded by identifying two major unresolved issues related to the IAEA experience in terms of its applicability to a chemical weapons agreement — the matter of challenge inspections and the nature of the verification institution which might be created.

In the second session, Gordon Vachon of the Canadian Department of External Affairs focussed on the background to, and current content of, the more detailed negotiations on the structure of the international chemical weapons verification authority and the international inspectorate. He also identified problems that are inherent both in the relevant details of the agreement to date and in the practical implications of those agreed items.

The third session consisted of a lengthy discussion moderated by Bas ter Haar of the Netherlands Foreign Ministry. At the outset, Mr. ter Haar stressed what he thought were the two basic differences between the IAEA safeguards model and the Chemical Weapons Convention (as the latter is