

Nations auspices. The continued deterioration of the local situation and the growing possibility of military intervention in Cyprus by Greece or Turkey provided strong incentives for establishing a United Nations peacekeeping force.

On 4 March 1964 the Security Council unanimously adopted Resolution 186 recommending the creation of the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) for the preservation of international peace and security. The Force was to prevent a recurrence of fighting and contribute to the maintenance of law and order and the restoration of normal conditions. The government of Cyprus agreed to the formation of the Force which was to be present for a period of three months. In spite of the Secretary-General's appeals to all parties for restraint and a de-escalation of violence, the situation in Cyprus continued to deteriorate and the danger of unilateral external intervention increased.

The Canadian response at this time was crucial to the rapid establishment of the Force. Parliament gave its approval for a Canadian contingent and an advance party of the 1,100-man Canadian contingent arrived in Cyprus on 15 March. The rapid arrival of the Canadian contingent combined with the British contingent already in place enabled UNFICYP to be operationally established by 27 March. This prompt action diminished the justification for unilateral action by Turkey. By the end of April, other national contingents and support organizations were on the island. By August 1964, UNFICYP force levels stabilized at just over 6,200 with military contingents from Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom. Also part of the force were civilian police contingents from Australia, Austria, Denmark, New Zealand and Sweden.

The peacekeeping operation was to be funded in a manner to be agreed upon by the troop-contributing nations, and the government of Cyprus and the Secretary-General were authorized to accept voluntary contributions for the maintenance of the Force, the requirement for which it was originally thought would be limited to a few months. The voluntary funding arrangement has proven to be an inequitable and inefficient means of financing a peacekeeping operation. Unlike other operations, troop-contributing nations had to provide the costs of the troops. Compensation for additional expenses of contingents and the central operating costs of UNFICYP could only keep balance with the inflow of voluntary contributions. From the beginning the Force was in a deficit position as there was a general reluctance to support voluntary contributions. The largest contributions to UNFICYP have been from NATO countries.

Acceptance of the voluntary funding formula was one of the compromises required to establish the Force. Within the Security Council, there was general agreement that the threat of communal violence leading to civil war, and possibly war between Greece and Turkey, required intervention. There were different views in the Security

Council on the nature of the problem: one view was that it was an issue of self-determination to be resolved by the Cypriots; another that the cause was unequal treaties forced upon the Republic of Cyprus which should be modified; and a third that the treaties formed part of a regional context from which the existence of Cyprus could not be separated. Of the permanent members, both the USSR and France opposed any arrangement which would give extensive freedom of action to either the mediator or the force commander, such as extended mandates or long-term financial arrangements.

One of the continuing dilemmas of UNFICYP remains how to balance an effective peacekeeping operation with the requirement to maintain the momentum in the search for an underlying political solution. Secure financing and a wide-ranging mandate with extensive delegated powers enhances the effectiveness of the peacekeeping function. On the other hand such longer-term perspectives may detract from the political will to compromise and achieve a political solution which is accepted as the objective of the peacemaking operation. Canada has argued consistently for a more equitable method of financing UNFICYP and queried how much longer the operation should be continued in the absence of any substantive progress towards a political settlement.

## UNFICYP OPERATIONS 1964-1974

The key principle of UNFICYP operations was complete impartiality towards both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities. The United Nations Force could resort to arms only in self-defence and then only under the principle of minimum force.

The perception of the UNFICYP's mandate differed according to communal viewpoints. Greek Cypriots saw UNFICYP as a means of suppressing the Turkish rebellion and extending the authority of the central government. In the view of the Turkish Cypriot community, UNFICYP should restore and protect their separate community status as guaranteed under the 1960 Constitution.

