

thing that should be done, but that it would be too disturbing; it would be hurtful to the United States, to the British and the French; it would interfere with the balance of power position, and so on. And I said, 'Well, I think it should be done.' The only real merit I deserve was that I kept at it; I persisted in this.

"So, with St. Laurent's approval, we drafted a resolution at the end of September and started to circulate it. I sent a message to Pearson in the Soviet Union and, to keep him on side, I referred to his speech at San Francisco. If he had been inclined not to go ahead in this direction, it would have been very difficult for him in view of that speech only two or three months before. We went ahead and raised the matter in the Commonwealth group meeting at the UN [then comprising Australia, Britain, Canada, India, New Zealand, Pakistan and South Africa]; and, much to the dismay of the British, all the Commonwealth countries thought this was a necessary and good thing to do.

"We started to get co-sponsors, and eventually we had 27. The whole issue took almost two-and-a-half months of the Assembly session. Harold Macmillan, the British foreign secretary, came into the picture and he joined with the Americans and the French against the initiative. They pointed out what would happen: if all these countries came in, and others followed, there would be a gradual shift of balance. Well, we knew what would happen; but that was what the United Nations was all about.

"The Americans handled it very badly, Dulles particularly. They tried to get us to withdraw the resolution, and Dulles threatened our acting ambassador in Washington, George Glazebrook, over oil imports from Canada. Cabot Lodge in his discussions with me at the same time went much further. He said, 'Well, we could cut out our purchases of oil from you'; and then he went on and complained about Pearson being against President Eisenhower, sharing Nehru's view about the Republican Party—'Nehru in a homburg' was a phrase used. I took strong exception to what Lodge had said about Pearson. So I stood up and told him that it was an affront not only to Mr. Pearson, it was an affront to the Canadian government and to me. Then I walked away. Cabot Lodge was like that; and Dulles was not a wise man—he was knowledgeable, but not wise.

"The British said, 'You had better wait for a while. After all, it is the Security Council that must decide this.' And we said, 'Yes, but the Security Council has tried three times over the years, and nothing has been done.' In the General Assembly there had been resolutions calling merely for a study of the question—as a matter of fact, we had done so seven years before and it had been turned down. That is what the Americans wanted us to do again and to change our resolution, and we said, 'No, that has been tried before and it is just ridiculous to go on this way.' So this was the first time a full resolution on the issue had been drafted for a debate and voting in the General Assembly. [Canada was not then on the Security Council. Among the non-permanent members, Belgium and New Zealand occupied those reserved for Western European and Others.]