at least is certain, that it is subjective in such a sense that it has no existence in absolute space, apart from the mind.

This explanation being made, we are now able to estimate aright Sir David Brewster's reasoning. Suppose rays from an object X Y to fall upon the retinal surface y x; the rays from X being brought to a focus at x: and those from y being brought to a focus at y.— Sir David argues, that, according to his law, an impulse on the retina at x gives vision in a direction perpendicular to the retina at x; and that an impulse on the retina at y gives vision in a direction perpendicular to the retina at y; and that, therefore, the phenomenon of an erect object is produced, though the picture on the retina is an inverted one. But " the phenomenon of an erect object," it must be kept in view, is not any thing having existence in space apart from the mind, and standing in an erect posture. It is a subjective (I do not say, *purely* subjective) representation. Now I presume that Sir David Brewster does not wish us to believe that this subjective representation itself is a corollary from the law of visible direction. He cannot mean more than that the mind's instinctive and determinate reference of the affections of which it is conscious to an erect exterior stimulus, is a corollary from the law of visible direction. And undoubtedly this reference is a demonstrable corollary from the law. But is it not plain, that, to assume that there is such a reference, instinctive and determinate, involved in, or connected with, the phenomenon of an erect object, is to assume the very thing about which there is any controversy? For what is it which those demand, who ask proof of the law of visible direction? They demand proof of the assertion, that the mind instinctively refers its vis-ual affections to a remote stimulus lying in any determinate direction whatever from the point of the retina excited.

Should the above criticisms be well founded, they are applicable to the whole of Sir David Brewster's reasoning; so that it is unnecessary to examine the details of other experiments to which he appeals. Our conclusion, therefore, is, that both his direct and his indirect proofs are entirely destitute of weight. The sole fact which he has established, is, that the subjective affections to which rays impinging on the retina give rise, are the same, whatever be the obliquity at which the rays strike the retina.

It is a curious circumstance that Sir David Brewster was anticipated in his Law of Visible Direction by a conjecture of D'Alembert, founded upon the idea that the stimulus proximately affecting the retina, acts, conformably to ordinary mechanical principles, in a