

to demi-official relations, in opposition to these, or to differ from these without subsequent official information, as a reason for doing so; as no one, not even an eye-witness, can know or appreciate the operations and the losses of an army, equal to the Commander in Chief thereof, like the Executive Government of the country. These should not be deviated from on common grounds. This is however, but too little attended to; and such practices, in many instances, where they are followed, instead of clearing up, tend only to darken the subject. In the reflections I at different times make, and in the conclusions which I at different times draw from the narrative before me, I have formed my judgment from the official documents, which I have taken for my guide. But as the words and the actions of the population of Europe and their leaders were, during the period to which I have confined my narrative, equally remarkable, and deserving our consideration and our attention; I have endeavoured to preserve the *manner* as well as the *matter* of the subject—not only what they *did*, but what they *said*, and how far I have succeeded in copying with fidelity, the spirit of the contending parties, it is for the reader to determine.

The tables of the strength and losses of the different armies, I have compiled with great care, from authentic documents, as these were noted by me from the commencement of 1812, in a regular journal, and in the same form as these are now given in this work. To the curious these may form amusement, and to the accurate, information. With regard to these, but particularly the French, I have adhered to the official dispatches of both parties. Immense as these appear, and as they in reality were, still it is plain, that they are not exaggerated. During 1812, and 1813, it was indeed, the only thing in which the French journals adhered to truth, in stating the force of their armies. These were in reality so numerous, that no exaggeration was necessary to make them appear most formidable. Nor is the accounts of the losses which the enemy sustained, as given by the Allies, at all exaggerated; because, if these had been so from design, the losses would never have corresponded with the force led against them; but which these do in a very remarkable manner, in every instance, where the official accounts touch upon these points. If the Allies had