

As you will see, our telegram No. Y-337 of June 5 to Saigon gave only a blurred version of what was said to Smith. This was of course deliberate: we thought it essential, in view of the sensitivity of the views we were expressing to the Americans, to restrict the circulation of the full version as much as possible. At the same time, Woodsworth in Saigon obviously had to be given a general indication of the line he could take with the American Ambassador there.

I realize that on reading the telegram to Saigon you must have found it rather cryptic, and I hope that this explanation will allay any qualms you may have had. Naturally, any comments you might wish to make at any time would be welcome.

Yours sincerely,

J.M. TEAKLES

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DEA/50052-A-13-40

*Le commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance
et de contrôle pour le Vietnam
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*
*Commissioner, International Commission for Supervision
and Control for Vietnam,
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM 140

Saigon, June 12, 1961

SECRET. CANADIAN EYES ONLY. PRIORITY.

Reference: Paras three and five your Tel Y-337 Jun 5.

Repeat for Information: Delhi, DM/DND, CCOS, CGS, London, Washington, Laosdel
Geneva from Ottawa.

USA AID TO VIETNAM

On receipt of your telegram I contacted USA Embassy. Counsellor informed me that Ambassador, temporarily absent from Saigon, [had] received new instructions to withhold detailed plans for increased MAAG and military aid program. In view of this and my wish for further instructions from you I suggested we postpone formal discussion.

2. In casual conversation June 12 Nolting confirmed that additional personnel contemplated is much larger than number envisaged by British. He did not repeat not clarify what increase would be military.

[C.J.] WOODSWORTH