

*Supply—External Affairs*

would weaken and indeed might even destroy NATO. We must then work together as members of this coalition if unity and strength are to be preserved. That is the very essence of the NATO concept, and without it NATO is not likely to last very long. Yet, this kind of close and continuous co-operation may be more difficult now in NATO than it has been, now that the fear of direct all out military aggression against western Europe seems to have lessened. That is one of the dangers confronting us. It is also, Mr. Chairman, the reason why the non-military aspects of co-operation are becoming more and more important. Indeed that form of co-operation, and we are beginning I think to recognize this more and more, is an important aspect of collective defence in the new situation.

I hope that the committee of three which has been set up by NATO will be able to make some recommendations in this field which will strengthen this side of NATO. This committee hopes to be able to finish its work and make its report some time in October.

But while, Mr. Chairman—this will be the last matter that I will be discussing in my general statement—NATO is important and is essential to our security and the development of the Atlantic community, the United Nations, with all its disappointments and its weaknesses as well as with all its accomplishments and its strengths, remains the basis of our general international policy. One of the most important things to be discussed through the United Nations now is, of course, disarmament. As members of the committee know, the subcommittee of the United Nations committee on disarmament, of which Canada has for some years now been a member, met in London last spring and the western side did produce proposals at that meeting which provided for the limitation and reduction of armaments by stages under control in each stage. It is also true that at that time it was proposed on our side that at the beginning of the second stage there should be a limitation on nuclear tests, a matter which is of very great and understandable interest to all of us, a limitation of nuclear tests supervised by a special branch of the international control organ.

At the meeting comprehensive agreement was not possible, and therefore an effort was made to bring about a more limited agreement as the first stage to making a more comprehensive agreement. The more limited agreement would have dealt primarily with conventional forces, but there was also a provision dealing with nuclear tests. But agreement on that was also not possible.

Therefore, the subcommittee reported in July to the full committee in New York and its report, one must admit, was one of progress only in a strictly academic and possibly parliamentary sense. In July the full committee met and at this meeting, at which Canada was represented by my colleague the Minister of National Health and Welfare, the four western members of the subcommittee introduced a resolution reaffirming the six basic principles which they accepted for a disarmament convention. I think it is important, in view of the interest in this matter, that these six basic principles be put on the record. I believe they have been found acceptable by a great many other countries.

They are:

1. A disarmament program should proceed by stages. Progress from one stage to another must depend upon the satisfactory execution of the preceding stage and upon the development of confidence through the settlement of major political problems.

2. The program should begin, under effective international control, with significant reductions in armed forces to such levels as are feasible. There should be corresponding reductions in conventional armaments and in military expenditures. Further reductions would be carried out as world conditions improved.

3. The program should provide that, at an appropriate stage and under proper safeguards, the buildup of stockpiles of nuclear weapons would be stopped and all future production of nuclear material would be devoted to peaceful uses. There would also be a limitation, before that took place, of nuclear tests.

4. The program should provide for a strong control organization with inspection rights, including aerial reconnaissance, operating from the outset and developing in parallel with the disarmament measure.

5. Preliminary demonstrations of inspection methods on a limited scale would help to develop an effective control system and could bring nearer a general agreement on a disarmament program.

6. Finally, there should be provision made for the suspension of the program, in whole or in part, if a major state failed to carry out its obligation or if a threat of peace under chapter VII of the United Nations charter should occur.

Well that, Mr. Chairman, is the position taken by the west at the recent meeting. I emphasize that in that position, which we have supported, even a partial agreement must contain some nuclear components. The representative of the United Kingdom at this