

(Mr. Tóth, Hungary)

face the fact that certain chemicals publicly described as possible agents for warfare are missing from our list. Also, there is good reason to presume that declared chemical-weapon States and other States known to have displayed "interest" towards this means of warfare might be in the possession of CW formulas that have not been made public so far. Thus, the danger of circumvention is inherent. Of course, it is hard to imagine any method to deal with the latter phenomenon. Yet we must be aware of certain facts of life if we are to maintain our clear-sightedness.

While there is an unquestionable need to have an adequate regime to make sure that chemical industries of future States parties are really engaged only in activities not prohibited under the convention, we should be realistic in our final objectives. It should have become obvious by now that a truly foolproof verification regime of the chemical weapons convention would entail financial and other burdens that most future parties would be reluctant to bear. However, a trade-off between possibilities and the safeguarding of implementation is indispensable. In our view, the verification system can be considerably strengthened by an enhanced challenge regime providing increased effectiveness relating, in particular, to facilities declared under article VI of the future convention.

It has often been said that one of the main purposes of verification is to detect non-compliance and through this, to deter potential violators. At the same time, realizing the limitations of any workable and feasible verification system for the chemical weapons convention, we might look at other ways as well to enhance the deterrence against possible violators. It is obvious that verification has the best chance to reveal a violation arising from the actual use of chemical weapons. This form of violation was also considered by the initiative put forward by President Bush as a grave breach of international law, and I do not believe that anybody in this hall thinks otherwise. Accepting this as a premise, the international community should have the resolve to take appropriate and determined action against any State that initiates the use of chemical weapons. This action, of course, would mean sanctions in the first place. The terms of the cease-fire putting an end to the Gulf conflict as reflected in United Nations Security Council resolution 687 established stringent rules and conditions for the vanquished and have provided an important precedent. Such terms in themselves could also become a form of dissuasion to any future aggressor or violator. It could also effectively complement the deterrent potential of verification expected to detect non-compliance. Thus, it might be advisable to take another look at provisions on "measures to redress a situation and to ensure compliance, including sanctions" that have recently been introduced into the draft convention.

There is one more issue that cannot be avoided when discussing the prohibition of use of chemical weapons, and that surely is the relation of the chemical weapons convention to the 1925 Geneva Protocol. We regard the CWC as replacing totally, for States parties, the obligations and rights assumed