

to some extent obstruct the team's ability to detect a violation.

To assess whether or not an inspected plant poses an immediate and high risk to the objectives of the convention, it was considered inappropriate to request a plain statement from the facility management concerning the capability of the plant to produce schedule-1-chemicals. Rather, the approach suggested is to request a number of statements and documentations, subject to verification, which would allow the inspection team to carry out an independent if qualitative risk assessment.

The answers to be provided by the plant management will have to be backed-up by maps, the plant design map already submitted in phase 1, and will be validated by independent verification activities such as visual checks and analytical tests of chemical storage (preferably head-space analysis). Again, an increment of this phase would be to assure that no signs of masking activities are detectable.

These statements and documents might include:

- The territorial situation of the site in relation to urban areas (cities, villages, etc.);
- A statement on special preparation at the plant for providing safety against chemical accidents (such as arrays of special chemical sensors or alarms, installations suitable for rapid decontamination of the site, availability of specific decontaminants at the plant, availability of individual protection equipments and its nature, etc.);
- A statement on special equipment installed at the plant, such as reaction vessel with inner surface coatings inert against highly corrosive gases (such as HF), or measures taken to provide for leak-protection to an unusual extent;
- A statement on the utilization (presence at the factory) of chemicals to assess the plant's "chemical capability", and notably of chemicals listed under schedules 2 and 3 of the convention.

For the evaluation of the risk that the plant poses to the objectives of the convention, the following assessments were conceived in combination:

1. A qualitative downwind hazard evaluation for nearby urban areas assuming production of a schedule-1 warfare agent at the factory, based on plant size and actual territorial features of the area.
2. Assessment of the plant's capability to produce a schedule-1-chemical based on available chemicals (starting materials, intermediates, final products).
3. Assessment of the plant's capability to produce a schedule-1-chemical based on the existing technological