

The nine previous ad hoc financing methods employed by the Assembly during the period 1957-62 are also of interest in our deliberations. With the exception that each ad hoc formula adopted was based upon the principle of collective financial responsibility, there are significant differences in the various factors applied and in the credits allowed. These differences were due primarily to the fact that circumstances differed considerably at the time of adoption of the various procedures. In particular, I would draw attention to the fact that in each case there is a specific relationship between the size of the peace-keeping budget and the amount of relief afforded to economically less-developed countries. Thus, during the period 1957-59 when the costs of UNEF were only \$15-25 million, all members were assessed at the rate used in conjunction with the regular budget. However, when in 1960 the costs of the operations in the Congo and the Middle East totalled \$68.5 million, credits were applied to reduce by 50 per cent the rate of assessment of certain developing countries. During the 1961-62 assessment periods peace-keeping costs were \$90-119 million and credits of 50 and 80 per cent were applied in the case of selected developing countries. Our examination of the previous ad hoc formulas suggests that any ad hoc method should be based upon the circumstances existing at the time of its adoption and, in particular, on the magnitude of costs of the relevant peace-keeping operation. This latter point has been recognized in part by the large number of members who support the idea of placing an initial amount of the costs of large-scale peace-keeping operations under the regular budget scale and, of taking into account the limited capacity of developing countries to pay when costs exceed a certain level and become a heavy financial burden. Therefore, if an ad hoc method is deemed appropriate by the Assembly for the immediate future, it would seem logical to develop a formula based upon present circumstances and conditions which are quite different from those prevailing at the sixteenth session.

Another important element is the wide range which exists not only among members' relative capacity to pay, but also in the relative priorities which governments set in determining the allocation of national resources. Any cost-sharing arrangement should take into consideration the fact that it would be unrealistic to divide the membership of the United Nations into two or three groups since some members have a relatively low capacity to pay but, due to their strong support for the United Nations, they may wish to relate their financial support to their moral support. On the other hand, some members have a relatively high capacity to pay, but unfortunately seem to lack any real desire to see the United Nations become an effective international instrument in the maintenance of world peace. The obligation on us to find equitable solutions to these two problems - on the one hand, the compelling need to provide sufficient funds in the next six months to continue the worthwhile operations in the Congo and the Middle East and, on the other, the formulation of acceptable principles to be taken into account in apportioning the costs of future peace-keeping operations - is very great. If we, as members of the United Nations, are unable to resolve our basic differences over a financially sound and equitable method of insuring the organization of the necessary funds, including the prompt payment of previous assessments, the United Nations stands in real danger of becoming no more than an expensive shell around a marble podium for the delivery of polite speeches which set out national positions, but make no real contribution to the advancement of the aims of the Charter.

For its part, my Delegation refuses to believe that this is the objective that the majority of the members is seeking to further. I sincerely hope that those members for which the United Nations represents a living and dynamic reality on the modern