

ment, but insisted that a treaty should close "all possible loopholes". The main Soviet objection to the United States draft was that it did not preclude Western proposals for the modification of NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, which, it was argued, would give the Federal Republic of Germany access to nuclear weapons. Early in the general debate, a Soviet counter draft treaty was tabled. The Honourable Paul Martin spoke strongly in support of a non-proliferation treaty and criticized what he described as the unreasonable Soviet position that members of the Western alliance should have no right to consult on defence policy. At the same time, he urged that a non-proliferation agreement should be accompanied by efforts by the great powers to reduce their nuclear arsenals. The debate in the First Committee tended to revolve around a United States procedural draft resolution which referred the question back to the ENDC for detailed discussion and a Soviet draft resolution which would have made the Soviet draft treaty the basis for discussion. Finally, a number of non-aligned delegations submitted a compromise draft resolution which, in urging all states to take the necessary steps for the early conclusion of a treaty, called upon the ENDC to give the problem urgent consideration and set out a series of principles to guide it in its deliberations. It was passed by a substantial majority, including Canada.

A number of countries argued that a non-proliferation treaty, which would deny to its signatories the right to acquire or develop their own nuclear weapons, would tend to discriminate against the non-nuclear signatories and should, therefore, be balanced by parallel concessions or obligations by the nuclear powers. Such provisions might include the extension of security assurances to non-aligned countries, a commitment to make progress towards general and complete disarmament, or the undertaking of such collateral disarmament measures as the halting of production or reduction of nuclear weapons and delivery vehicles or a comprehensive nuclear test ban.

An extension of the 1963 partial test ban could have an importance beyond its relationship to an agreement on non-proliferation. It would halt tests in the fourth environment, underground, and would, therefore, check nuclear weapons development and, as had its predecessor, give further impetus to the disarmament movement. Both the Soviet bloc and Western countries, along with the non-aligned, agree on the desirability of a comprehensive ban, but they do not agree on the means by which such an agreement should be verified. For its part, the Soviet Union argues that national means of detection are sufficient to determine whether clandestine underground tests have taken place. The United States, on the other hand, contends that, despite recent advances in seismological techniques in detection, some on-site inspections would still be essential if signatories to a comprehensive test ban are to