

permanent members of the Security Council in the membership of the Commission. On the questions of Chinese representation on the Commission, and of the use of the United Nations Panel of Field Observers by the Commission, the U.S.S.R. did, however, withhold its approval. With the adoption of this provision, machinery exists whereby either the Security Council or the Assembly (or the Interim Committee when the Assembly is not in session) can, with the consent of the states directly concerned, call upon its own observation agency to proceed to a danger region and to report on the facts as it finds them.

Part C of the resolution was not unnaturally the most controversial of the five main provisions. It asked member states to maintain within their own national armed forces elements so trained, organized and equipped that they could promptly be made available for service as United Nations units upon recommendation by the Security Council or the General Assembly. As expected, this proposal was singled out for concentrated attack by the Soviet bloc, which professed to see in it a violation of the enforcement provisions of the Charter, and in particular an attempt to transfer the functions of the Security Council to the General Assembly. In accordance with these objections the U.S.S.R. put forward a series of amendments and counter-proposals. Among these was a proposal, later adopted as an independent resolution in slightly revised form, that renewed efforts be made to apply those articles of the Charter designed to provide for the establishment of United Nations military forces available to the Security Council.

In reply to the Soviet objections and counter-proposals, the sponsoring delegations made it clear that it was not the purpose of the resolution to relieve the Security Council of its primary responsibility for maintaining international peace. In Mr. Pearson's words: "(The resolution) does not sabotage the Security Council. It merely establishes peace machinery under the Assembly to supplement the Security Council when the latter body sabotages itself. If the Security Council can work effectively to defend the peace and defeat the aggression, this resolution will never have to be invoked." The majority of delegations regarded Part C as a practical and legally justifiable means of ensuring that if the Security Council was prevented from acting against an aggressor, the Assembly would be enabled to do so through the moral force of a recommendation to member states. Moreover, it was essential, in Mr. Pearson's words, to put "police power behind the United Nations will for peace" without delay. Mr. Pearson reminded the Committee that Canada had pioneered in this field, and that the Canadian Government had already recruited a special force which was being trained and equipped for service under the United Nations. He drew attention to the need for general observance of the provision recommending the organization of such units by member states, adding that "if sufficient forces of this kind could be held in readiness, it would be a powerful deterrent to anyone who would disturb the peace".

Although there was general support for the underlying purpose of Part C of the resolution, a number of its provisions were subjected to lengthy debate, leading in some cases to textual amendments.