

left his headquarters about three o'clock that afternoon, and did not appear during the whole day on the battle-field.

The report establishes that the marshal was completely and continually informed by the marshals and generals in command of the progress of the enemy's attack towards the right, of the weakness of the artillery of the 6th Corps, and the scarcity of ammunition, which compelled it to slaken its two Marshal Canrobert only received direct from Marshal Bazaine in answer to his pressing requests, two reserve batteries and a few caissons of ammunition. During the whole day Marshal Bazaine sent none of his staff to obtain intelligence from the scene of action, and received unmoved the urgent demands for help sent to him from the 6th Corps. The report quotes several telegraphic despatches of Marshal Bazaine to Marshal MacMahon and the Emperor, with the object of still further proving that he was fully informed of the progress of the battle throughout the day. At the same time it is pointed out that in these messages the marshal mentioned nothing of the critical position of the 6th Corps, and that his last message to the Emperor, time 1 50 p m., is worded in such a manner as to make His Majesty believe that he had been on the field of battle all through the action. General Rivière describes the marshal's conduct as one of culpable inactivity, and holds him responsible for the blood uselessly shed and the defeat of the French Army, prelude to the final disaster. He contrasts the marshal's total absence from the field during a battle of such vital importance for France with the conduct of the King of Prussia, who directed in person the attack of his army on the French position. General Rivière does not admit the validity of the excuses made by Marshal Bazaine, alleging as a reason for his immobility on the left the danger threatening that portion of his army. The left wing occupied the strongest part of the line, and was amply defended in every respect. In conclusion, General Rivière says Marshal Bazaine abandoned Marshal Canrobert, and is personally responsible for the defeat of the 18th and its terrible consequences.

The report proceeds to the conclusion that the marshal had an object in view independent of the execution of his orders. This object appears all through the events from the 12th to the 23rd of August. Marshal Bazaine did not wish to leave Metz. If he had, he would, on assuming command, have ordered his army to debile by the town bridges on the morning of the 13th, since the temporary bridges were covered by the Moselle. If he had wished to leave Metz he could have used the three roads available for reaching the plateau, instead of massing all his troops on the Gravelotte Road alone. He would not, on the 15th of August, have disbanded his auxiliary train—a measure which cut off his supply of provisions and stopped his march. Had he wished to leave Metz he would, after provisioning early on the morning of the 17th, either have recommenced the battle or taken the road to the Brié. On the contrary, his first thought is to establish himself between Vigneuilles and Lessy. Then hesitating over so evident a movement of retreat, he occupies the upper part of the Valley of Morveaux, behind which he proposes to bring the army on the morning of the 19th. If Marshal Bazaine did not wish to leave Metz, we ask, without finding a plausible reason, why he did not avoid a useless battle on the 18th, which cost his army such heavy losses, most dangerously increased the number of wounded at Metz, and shook the morale of his army.

After following the operations round Metz, Battle of Borny, August the 14; Rezonville, August 16; St. Privat, August 18, the report passes to another question, that of the communications with the army of Metz. On the 18th August Major Magnan and Commissary Preval left Metz for Chalons with despatches for the Emperor. They were also instructed to give the Emperor verbally full details upon the position of affairs.

When questioned in the preliminary inquiry Major Magnan says the object of the Marshal was to retreat upon Verdun, but at the time of sending him to Chalons he had not decided what route he would take. The marshal, however, requested M. Magnan and Preval to send towards the northern frontier towns any provision trains destined for his army that they might meet on the Ardennes line. M. Preval deposed that the Marshal mentioned Longuyon to him as the centre to which supplies should be sent. In a despatch to the Emperor, dated Aug. 19, Marshal Bazaine says:—"I still intend going northwards and making for Montmédy." The Emperor confided full instructions for Marshal Bazaine to Major Magnan, but the latter officer's depositions respecting them have been so confused that General Rivière rather looks to the measures following his mission than to his depositions to ascertain what the Emperor's instructions must have been. Major Magnan returned to Montmédy, where great preparations were being made in view of the junction of the Chalons and Metz armies. The report considers it certain that communications were exchanged between him and Marshal Bazaine, and that if the major did not return to Metz it was because he was ordered by Bazaine not to do so. Such a course on the marshal's part is explained on the hypothesis that he wished to be able to allege ignorance of the instructions sent to him, and thus remain his own master. The report considers this all the more probable, because the marshal positively denied having received the despatch of the 23rd Aug.; besides, which the care he afterwards took to shelter himself under the impossibility of communicating with the interior of France and the new Government, clearly denotes a systematic course on the marshal's part. The reporter says he would have hesitated in stating this hypothesis had it not been observed throughout the inquiry that Marshal Bazaine had evidently habitually sought to furnish himself with pretexts to escape the responsibilities of his position.

During the reading of the above the members of the court followed the report on large maps distributed to them. Marshal Bazaine remained always impassive. Little interest was manifested in the report until the clerk reached the passage in which it mentions that several despatches addressed by Marshal Bazaine to Marshal MacMahon were intercepted by Colonel Stoffel, director of the Intelligence Department on Marshal MacMahon's staff. This passage produced a great impression on the judges, who took notes, and upon the auditory.

The sitting was here suspended for a quarter of an hour.

Relative to the delivery of despatches destined for the Emperor and Marshal MacMahon, the report states that they were always delivered or transmitted by two inspectors of police to Colonel Stoffel, and never to Marshal MacMahon or to the Emperor direct. These inspectors were obtained on the 18th of August from M. Pietri by Colonel Stoffel, who, on the 20th of August ordered them to get to Marshal Bazaine and receive any despatches he might have to

send. He further requested them to address to him personally all the information they obtained. The two inspectors reached Longwy at the same time as Guyard, another police officer, coming from Thionville, bearer of four despatches dated the 20th. They received these despatches from him, and sent copies of them Colonel Stoffel, who then ordered them to return to the army. They rejoined the army on the 26th of August at Bethel, and then delivered the original despatches to the colonel. The report continues—"There is overwhelming proof that Colonel Stoffel intercepted the despatch addressed to the marshal. Is it possible that he should have presumed to do that on his own authority? This cannot be admitted. Evidently he received orders to that effect. From whom?" This question the report does not answer, but proceeds to say:—"However this may be, Col. Stoffel, in becoming an accomplice in deceiving Marshal MacMahon, his own chief, committed an unheard of act. This fact may invest the proceedings with considerable importance, for it will certainly be adduced as a ground of exculpation for Marshal Bazaine as regards his share of responsibility for the catastrophe of Sedan. Although the marshal had no complicity in the manœuvre which intercepted his despatch of the 20th of August to Marshal MacMahon, he is still accused of keeping silence in his despatches of the same day to the Emperor and the Minister of War upon the essential point that later advice would be given to announce the movement of the army of Metz.

The report proceeds to say that although the suppression of Marshal Bazaine's despatch of the 20th only spared Marshal MacMahon fresh cause of hesitation, it cannot relieve Marshal Bazaine of his primary responsibility for the catastrophe of Sedan. The Report then calls attention to the announcement made by the marshal to the Government that he intended to make sorties, his reiterated complaints of the paucity of provisions, all tending to cause fresh efforts to be made to come to his aid. As these efforts terminated by a catastrophe, the report considers the marshal fully responsible for the same in not having contradicted his first assertions, as well as by his subsequent conduct when, being made aware of the intentions of Marshal MacMahon, he did not attempt any movement to diminish the danger which Marshal MacMahon bravely encountered to come to the assistance of the commander in chief. The report then goes on to state that numerous emissaries had been sent to Metz to inform the marshal of the situation, some by the Empress and some by the Minister of War.

(To be continued.)

The service of the Khedive of Egypt is proving very attractive to American Army officers. A number of the best men of the Confederate Army have already joined, together with officers of the United States Army, who have materially improved their position by so doing. General Stone, of the Egyptian Army, was one of the heroes of Ball's Bluff, and he has now been joined by Major Perry, who served under him in the same regiment. Our American cousins regard with equanimity these frequent departures, but all who have reason to fear the independence of Egypt, either in a military or a diplomatic sense, will hardly look upon them in the same spirit.