## 1897] Worship a Condition of the Highest Morality. 297

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of the personal nature of the absolute ground of all reality.\* Even Fichte himself later practically put the personal God in the place of his moral world order.+

A final argument for the divine personality may be drawn from the following implication of moral obligation: If we are to be moral, we need to believe that our life and the world are so ordered that morality is possible. This faith rests on the assumption of an intelligent Creator of the universe of which we are in some sense a part. Socrates, while he did not teach a philosophy of nature directly, really did so indirectly, for he implied that the righteous man would be happy and favored, because the world was so ordered as to work in his behalf. "This arrangement of the world could only arise from the wisdom and beneficence of the creative reason which we can nowhere seek but among the gods." ; Kant in the Critique of the Practical Reason makes the existence of God the postulate of the certainty of happiness consequent upon virtue. Paul Janet says: "Man hopes and prays and believes that somehow the right not only ought to be done but can be done, not only ought to prevail but will prevail, and this conviction leads him to postulate the existence of the God who is able to establish righteousness and reward the faithful." The thought is that unless men did believe in the ultimate triumph of righteousness and goodness through a God of righteousness and goodness, there would not be a sufficient motive for the moral life. Hence, Janet says : "I make religion the practical condition of morality," and so may we.§

Reviewing our argument for the necessary connection between morality and religion, we have seen that, psychologically, the consciousness of moral obligation is not derived empirically, but is, with Kant, revealed in reason, and is, in addition to Kant, supported by a unique and underived form of feeling; that, considered from the metaphysical standpoint, this moral "law," like other laws of the finite, must be grounded in ultimate Being; that an analysis of moral phenomena shows

<sup>\*</sup>Lotze, Microcosmus, II., 673 ff.

<sup>+</sup>Otto Pfleiderer, Philosophical Review, Sept. '96, p. 464, 469. ‡Zeller's Outlines of Greek Philosophy, p. 111 ff. §Theory of Morals, 472-482.