

true dignity, of his nature, is selfishness. "It begets a morality so unmoral as to be fatally immoral."

These propositions Dr. Gregory must either believe or be held to misrepresent those whom he assails. They can be believed only by those who hold, as many do, that it is selfish for a man to seek his own highest good. In the view of others who believe, as I do, that it is the duty of a man to seek his own best good as well as the good of others, the propositions confute themselves.

The 3d proposition is, that essential morality, or virtue, consists in doing right because it is right. His language is, that the "command of the moral law is not, Do right if you would be happy, or, Do right if you would be a man, but, Do right because it is right, or the will of God."

In this last injunction it seems to be assumed, and indeed must be, since there can be but one ultimate standard of action, that to do a right action because it is right, and to do an action because it is the will of God, are the same thing. But that is an entire mistake. To do right because it is right is a principle of action that ignores the sensibility as far as that is possible. It excludes from the sphere of morality, in opposition to the Scriptures, the ideas of reward and punishment. It is godless. If an action is wholly from a sense of right, there is no will of God in the case. But to do an action because it is the will of God is a wholly different thing. It involves faith in Him, and the idea of a good in some way to be attained. We may not see how the good is to be attained. The command may seem to us in opposition to all rational plans for good. But here comes in the imperative *ought*. God has rights over us. These rights involve obligation on our part, and because He is God, and it is rational that we should honor Him by an unlimited trust, our obedience *ought* to be unquestioning, unlimited, unto death. This is wholly different from doing what we suppose to be, and what may be, a right action because it is right. The two are incompatible, and we must choose between them. I choose the doing of the will of God, not as mere will, but because it is His will, and in so doing give to the imperative *ought* its fullest scope. In so doing I also bring into full play the sensibility as well as the intellect.

The foregoing observations, so far as they are personal, are of slight account; but as the system put forth in the essay so fully ignores the sensibility, I make them as preliminary to a brief inquiry into the place which that must hold in any correct theory of morals. This inquiry is fundamental, and yet I do not remember to have seen it pursued specifically.

The division of the mind into Intellect, Sensibility and Will, is now generally accepted. So far as we are rational, Sensibility is conditioned on Intellect, and Will on Intellect and Sensibility combined.