

the rich-poor gap (11 per cent), "humanitarian" or "moral" (11 per cent) — or as a means to promote Canada's interest indirectly, and in the long run, by contributing to a peaceful international order (8 per cent). Asked to name the country that behaved most like Canada in international affairs, over half named one of the Scandinavians (45 per cent) or the Netherlands (9 per cent), while 29 per cent cited a member of the white Commonwealth. A reason frequently offered for the selection was that the other country shared with Canada a genuine concern for the well-being of the weak and the poor.

(Independently of the CIIS project, one of the authors interviewed 71 foreign elite members in 25 Asian and European capitals; although by a smaller margin (60 per cent compared to 77 per cent), they also perceived Canada's aid as primarily altruistic, and the largest portion (49 per cent) concurred that, in its general behaviour, Canada most closely resembled those nice Scandinavians (39 per cent) especially Sweden, or the Netherlands (10 per cent). Whatever the factual basis, one must accept that Canada's international image, both at home and abroad, remains remarkably benign.)

Image remains remarkably benign

Objectives

To gain a more comprehensive understanding of the values of the Ottawa decision-makers, the CIIS interviewers asked them to indicate the weight that should be assigned 11 objectives in determining Canada's aid policy. Four-fifths agreed with the proposition that an important objective should be "to assist those recipient countries whose need is greatest". Far less support was accorded such objectives as promoting Canadian exports (52 per cent) or fighting Communism (22 per cent). It is difficult to be certain whether the elite attached less value to these objectives, or simply considered economic aid to be an inefficient means to attain them. Other CIIS questions revealed that Canadian decision-makers are no longer militantly anti-Communist, but more of them might favour using aid to wage the Cold War if only they thought it might work.

The objective given the strongest endorsement was the promotion of stability in the recipient countries. This is not necessarily in conflict with the desire to assist the most needy, which received almost the same support. The respondents may well have reasoned that economic well-being is improbable without stability. Not everyone recognizes, as has Mitchell

atters Canada's material well-being, especially to his nose related to the law of the sea. Obvious Cana...ives involving global economic redistribution, or human rights, emerged right altruism... the bottom.

ch Can... Although four-fifths of the Canadian foreign-policy elite concurred that non-aligned countries are significant in world affairs, they appeared to attach relatively little importance to the organizations in which these nations are predominant. Only 13 per cent perceived the United Nations, increasingly a Third World club, as gaining in influence; 60 per cent perceived decline. The reduction in influence was frequently attributed to the disparity between UN voting and "real" power, and the consequent disregard of many Assembly resolutions. The few who perceived an increase in the UN's stature often referred to the shift in its agenda to issues, such as poverty and race discrimination, that matter more to more people than do the traditional Cold War and security issues. For most of the Canadian decision-makers, however, this shift seems more to be deplored than encouraged.

Commonwealth

The Commonwealth is the organization in which Canada interacts most intimately with Third World countries. Unlike the UN, it has engaged the wholehearted enthusiasm of the Prime Minister. Only two-fifths of the foreign-policy elite, however, share his conviction that "the Commonwealth is a significant factor in international relations". At least in principle, the elite endorsed the Third Option, the Government's strategy to diminish Canada's dependence upon the United States, but only 3 per cent mentioned Third World countries as the likeliest with which to generate countervailing relations. By a wide margin, the elite perceived the European Community as a more influential actor in international affairs than the Organization of Petroleum-Exporting Countries. In terms of Canadian priorities, the makers of our foreign policy clearly regard Third World countries as the ones that could most easily be ignored.

Twelve of the CIIS propositions dealt with the motivation of Canada's development assistance. Less than a fifth of the elite perceived it to be primarily self-interested in any direct way, such as to promote Canadian exports (6 per cent), or a means to augment Canadian influence (9 per cent). Over three-quarters saw it as essentially altruistic — to help the most needy (48 per cent), to close