

of Three Report recognized this, also that new institutional arrangements or organizational changes or changes in structure would not in themselves meet this need.

What is required, and this is easier to say than to bring about, is a sustained will and desire on the part of member governments to work out through consultation policies which will take into account the common interests of the members of the alliance. If that is not done and if national factors alone prevail in the formulation of policy, then the alliance will have great difficulty in surviving. Certainly it will not develop beyond a purely military arrangement which will disappear if and when the fears and emergencies of the present lessen and disappear.

The most powerful member of our NATO coalition, and as recent history has perhaps demonstrated the only one which now has the economic and military power to enable it to discharge fully truly world-wide responsibilities, is the United States. Within the last few days the Administration in Washington has proposed to Congress an increased acceptance of those responsibilities in the middle East in what is called the Eisenhower doctrine.

I do not think it would be appropriate for me to discuss in detail a proposal of the United States Government which is now before Congress and concerning which differences of opinion have already appeared, but I think I can say without impropriety that the ideas behind this doctrine are welcomed by this Government as evidence of the increased interest of the United States in the Middle East in terms of both defence and economic aid for the development of the area. It seems to me important that those two things go together there as elsewhere.

Mr. Dulles, in quoting the President's declaration to a Congressional Committee, has warned, and I think the warning is a good one, that no single formula will solve all the problems in the Middle East and that there is no single panacea for them. Nevertheless it is quite obvious I think that those proposals have very important implications which have been very well put in my view by the Washington correspondent of the Winnipeg Free Press, and I quote from one of his articles as follows:

The American Government, once Congress has given its expected approval,—

Or perhaps as I should say "if Congress gives its expected approval."

—will be committed to a solemn and unprecedented obligation in the Middle East. It will be pledged to use force if necessary to protect that region from Russia or from any state responsive to Russia's pressures.

Then Mr. Freedman went on to say this:

That is the ultimate commitment. There can be none greater. It has been defined in this challenging form to prevent Russia from believing that the eclipse of British and French influence allows it to bring the Middle East under Moscow's control.

Mr. Stewart, (Winnipeg North): Does that doctrine not suggest there is a danger of by-passing the United Nations?

Mr. Pearson: I do not think so. It has been said that the principles and the procedures envisaged in this doctrine are the same as those which prompted Anglo-French intervention in the Suez crisis last October. But I doubt whether that deduction will be borne out by the text of the Presidential declaration which contains the following points, and some of these bear on the particular point raised by my friend the hon. member for Winnipeg North: (1) any assistance against aggression would be given only at the request of the state attacked; (2) any obligation to give such assistance is restricted to overt aggression by any nation controlled by international communism; (3)—and this is of some importance—any measures taken must be consistent with the Charter of the United Nations and with any action or any recommendations of the United Nations; and I take it that would mean either positive or negative action by the United Nations.

Mr. Green: Does that mean that action is taken first and then the United Nations acts afterwards or just what does it mean?

Mr. Pearson, I think I had better stick to the wording of the declaration. You know what happened in the case of Korea, Mr. Speaker. Certain action was taken by one member of the United Nations. But within half an hour or an hour, I forget which—within a very short time—the matter was referred at once to the Security Council and this action was before Security Council for confirmation or otherwise.

Mr. Green: That is only because Russia was absenting herself.

Mr. Pearson: True, confirmation was received only because Russia absented herself from the Security Council. But we now have a procedure by which, when action is vetoed in the Security Council, the Assembly can be called together within twenty-four hours and the matter referred to the Assembly, as was done indeed last October.

The fourth point is that the measures to be taken or envisaged would be "subject to the overriding authority of the United Nations Security Council in accordance with the charter".

Then, Mr. Speaker, I think I should also point out—and this is of some importance—that the declaration does not deal with conflict between non-communist states in the Middle East nor does it deal with communist subversion brought about by non-military means.

Welcome as is this indication of the acceptance by the United States of a direct and immediate responsibility for peace and economic progress in the Middle East, even more welcome to a Canadian would be the full restoration of close and friendly relations between London, Paris and Washington in respect of that area, and the strengthening of their co-operation generally.