1246 FAR EAST

765. DEA/50052-A-40

Le commissaire de la Commission internationale de surveillance et de contrôle pour le Vietnam au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures

Commissioner, International Commission for Supervision and Control for Vietnam, to Secretary of State for External Affairs

TELEGRAM 246

Saigon, December 4, 1961

SECRET. OPIMMEDIATE from Delhi.

Reference: Our Tel 243 Dec 1.†

Repeat for Information: Delhi, DM/DND, CCOS, DGPO, CGS, London, Washington,

Paris, Laosdel Geneva from Ottawa.

By Bag Warsaw, Moscow from London, Vientiane, Phnom Penh, Hanoi from Saigon.

PARTHASARATHI AND NAM CASE

I had a long informal talk with Parthasarathi December 2 on Nam case and the Commission. My first impression of him was good – that he was both intelligent and competent and prepared to cast his mind beyond the detail of Commission.

- 2. It is clear, as already reported from Delhi, that Indians are prepared to investigate Nam case. Parthasarathi thinks there is a prima facie case and this should make possible a fairly quick determination in Legal Committee. With regard to the actual investigation he is thinking of a second reference to Legal Committee and does not repeat not see necessity of a mobile investigation, while agreeing that it was substance of investigation rather than its form which was important, I nevertheless stressed advantage of a special mobile team for reasons outlined below.
- 3. While convinced that there is a prima facie (case?) and that it should be investigated, Parthasarathi is less convinced that the investigation will throw up definite proof of Northern contravention of the Agreement. He wonders how it will be possible to prove authenticity of evidence, if Indians do not repeat not wish ultimately to cite North for violation of Agreement their line will perhaps be based on this point.
- 4. Parthasarathi said he was also worried about effect of Commission decision on Northern and Southern governments. Obviously if decision went against North and if they were cited their attitude toward Commission would be extremely hostile. On other hand if decision went against South their hostile reaction could be easily predicted. Parthasarathi claimed that he was not repeat not going to be influenced by these predictable reactions but it was nevertheless pertinent to think about them and to see whether there was not repeat not some way of ensuring and strengthening the future role of Commission. He made two other points which give a forecast on his intentions: (1) Investigation of Nam case must be developed with Polish cooperation. He was doubtful whether Commission or its bodies could legally function with a quorum of two; he seemed more certain that it should not repeat not be allowed to happen (2) Indian Delegation wanted to improve procedures of Commission but this would work both ways. They would be impartial in investigating Northern and Southern allegations. Implication was that USA reinforcement of South Vietnam would receive as careful attention as Nam case and perhaps be used to offset a possible decision against North.