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DEA/50069-A-40

*L'ambassadeur aux États-Unis  
au secrétaire d'État aux Affaires extérieures*  
*Ambassador in United States  
to Secretary of State for External Affairs*

TELEGRAM WA-1412

Washington, June 27, 1950

SECRET. IMMEDIATE.

## KOREA

1. George Perkins was in the Chair, assisted by George Kennan, when the Ambassadors of the North Atlantic Treaty countries assembled at the State Department at 11:30 this morning. All the North Atlantic Treaty countries were represented except Luxembourg.

2. George Perkins explained that this meeting was not to be regarded as an emergency meeting of the North Atlantic Council. It had been decided to invite the Ambassadors of the North Atlantic Treaty countries as representatives of countries friendly to the United States in order that they might be informed of action which the President had decided to take to restore the situation arising from the invasion of South Korea by forces from North Korea.

3. Perkins read out the statement which the President issued at twelve noon today, the text of which I am sending in my immediately following teletype.† You will observe that the reference to Communist instigation of the attack has been reworded to omit reference to direct Soviet responsibility, to accord with the wishes expressed by the United Kingdom Government. Franks spoke briefly on this point, emphasizing that in the view of his Government it was essential to give the Russians an opportunity to beat a retreat when confronted by what he described as “the welcome manifestation of American power and determination”.

4. The interesting part of the proceedings was an explanation furnished by George Kennan of the background of the considerations which led to the President's decision to order United States air and sea forces to give the Korean Government troops cover and support, and to order the Seventh Fleet to take action to prevent attack on Formosa, as well as to give further support to the Philippines and to accelerate assistance to the forces of France in Indo-China.

5. First of all, Kennan gave an analysis of the State Department's appreciation of the motives of the Communists who had been responsible for launching the attack. While stressing that this motivation was based on a mixture of considerations, he cited three factors in particular:

(a) That they thought that the time had arrived at which the arming and training of the forces of North Korea had reached a stage of completion to permit successful operations against South Korea;

(b) A realization on the part of the Soviet Government that Russia would have nothing to do with the Japanese Peace Treaty, at least in so far as its military