

memory of England's gentle and benignant rule over us, while she taught us the lessons of constitutional government. For all time, too, wherever our great populations are descended from her noble stock, we shall cherish the pride of kindred, shall claim our share in the glories of her literature, her martial prowess, and her commercial triumphs. But these rights are not to us an exclusive heritage, and we but hold them in common with the descendants, all over the world, of the great Foster-mother of nations; and I am enquiring after the special advantages of the connection. These are not to be found in our commercial intercourse, for here we are left to compete against the world. It is not that her abundant capital, attracted by our loyalty and affection, flows in upon us because we are a dependency; to develop our resources, and to awaken the hum of industry along our shores; for that capital seeks only a safe return of its investments, and is oftener drawn where it is better rewarded, among strangers. It is not that the prestige of the connection gives us a position among the peoples of the earth; for our powers are merely local and municipal, and bear the taint of inferiority and dependence. There remains, therefore, but the one advantage, and we end, as Mr. Cameron began for us,—the advantage of the connection is narrowed to the solitary matter of defence; and we shall see, as we proceed, that even this is of doubtful utility. Defence presupposes attack, which we have only to dread from our republican neighbours. But, the difficulties with them, are always of an Imperial character. The Trent affair, the Alabama claims, and the Irish Fenian quarrel with England, were all as foreign to us as the China Seas, and interested us only in their consequences. It is not true that the same may be said of Liverpool or Dublin for a hundred reasons; but especially, because they are part of the British Isles, and are represented in the British Parliament. We have no voice and cannot influence the foreign policy of the empire. There is only for us the duty of waiting till war is declared, and the luxury of becoming the field of blood, the theatre of desolation. Thus England would defend us, but from what, but the consequences of her own quarrels? We have no occasion for dangerous controversy with our neighbours on our own account. Our interests are blended with theirs, and tend to mutual comity and good will, and the dangers of conflict will be a thousand fold removed when British entanglements are avoided. This fact has been again and again admitted by British Statesmen. During the debate in the House of Commons on the defences in 1865, Mr. S. Fitzgerald declared, that if Canada were independent, there would be no cause of quarrel between her and the United States. That it could be only through a desire to strike at England, that America would

attack us. Canadians had not permitted the Alabama to escape or precipitately acknowledged belligerent rights, and there could be no cause of quarrel, except that she was united to England; and his belief was, that if Canada were independent to-morrow, she would not run the slightest danger of a contest. Mr. Carlwell adverted to that speech, as one, against whose tone the Government could make no complaint, and the sentiment was received with the approving hear, hears, of the House. In the same debate Mr. Bright, whose views have not changed, and who is a power in England at this moment, declared, that should any occasion to defend us arise, it would not result from anything done by us, but would be a war growing out of the relations between the Cabinets of London and Washington.

It is true that in case of war, we should be no match for the power of our neighbours. But our dependence would be in the right and in the comity of nations. There is no reason to fear that they would be aggressive. Mexico, Cuba, the South American States have maintained their autonomy without molestation. And besides, as Mr. Cameron suggested the other day, there would probably be little difficulty in arranging for a British and American protectorate.

It is to be regretted of course, that a portion of the American press, adopt a disagreeable and sensational tone upon this subject, and it suits the views of certain journals here to give these utterances an unnecessary prominence. They preach, of course, the manifest destiny of annexation, and they laugh at our Independence, as impossible of maintenance for six months after its achievement. They say, it is impossible for two peoples, of the same race and language to live alongside, without the absorption of the smaller by the greater. This is mere vapid assertion. The experiment of course was never tried, because the prescribed conditions were wanting. But what did these peoples preach, about the Southern Confederacy? Did they not prate loudly of her power to sustain a national existence? And though she failed after prodigies of valour and skill; what reasonable man doubts, that, could she have achieved her independence, she might subsequently have maintained it? Yet, the South was far behind us in her appreciation of freedom, and the true elements of a nation's greatness. It is only poor Canada which is to be sneered and jeered, into clinging to a system of tutelage and inferiority for ever. It was not the fashion to disparage her resources and poh, poh, her aspirations, when the Hon. George Brown, in his Confederation speech spread out the map and invited the House, to an enthusiastic study of her magnificent geography. He traced the island of Newfoundland, and found it equal in extent, to the kingdom of